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Abstract
Since 1999, regional retail and wholesale gasoline markets in the United States have
experienced significant price volatility, both intertemporally and across geographic
markets. In particular, gasoline prices in California, Illinois and Wisconsin have
spiked occasionally well above gasoline prices in nearby states. The three chapters of
my thesis study the relationship between gasoline price spikes, environmental regu-
lation of gasoline content, unanticipated refinery outages and other recent structural
changes in the domestic oil market.
In the first chapter, I detail current regulations related to gasoline content. Im-
plemented regionally to address local mobile-source emissions, gasoline content reg-
ulations increase costs to refiners, transporters and distributors of gasoline, as well
as reduce the fungibility of gasoline across different regions. Chapter one provides
a summary of the regulations and a qualitative description the costs the regulations
impose on refiners, transporters and distributors of gasoline.
In chapter two, I estimate two distinct effects of gasoline content regulations in
California, Illinois and Wisconsin: (i) the effect of increased production costs due to
supplementary regulation, and (ii) the effect of incompatibility between these blends
and gasoline meeting federal reformulated gasoline standards. Using a structural
model based on the production optimization problem of refiners, I simulate wholesale
prices for jet fuel, diesel and four blends of gasoline in each geographic market. I then
specify a counterfactual in which gasoline in the three states met federal requirements.
Using a similar methodology, I also estimate the effect of two structural changes in
the domestic oil market, (i) changes in refinery ownership and (ii) limited expansion
of domestic refining capacity.
I estimate the effect of increased refining costs is 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents per gallon
in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. The effect of incompatibility with federal RFG
criteria, conditional on an in-state refinery outage, is 4.8, 6.6 and 7.1 cents per gallon
in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. Controlling for the magnitude of local outages
in these areas, I estimate that 72, 92 and 91 percent of price spikes created by local
refinery outages could be mitigated by compatibility with federal RFG standards.
In chapter three I study the challenge faced by regulators of differentiating strate-
gic withholding of capacity from unreliable production. If a regulator cannot verify
"unplanned" outages, the regulator cannot credibly distinguish between strategic be-
havior by producers and unlucky realizations of facility reliability. I specify a model
in which a firm's choices of production and maintenance affect facility reliability and
study how incentives arising from ownership of more than one facility affect facility
reliability. I then statistically test whether the pattern of incidents is consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical model. I find statistically significant evidence that
ownership of other local refining capacity is correlated with the probability of an out-
age at a given refinery. In addition, the relationship between ownership and incident
likelihood is greatest for markets with special gasoline formulations, where a refinery
outage has the largest effect of gasoline prices. In these markets, expected incident
likelihood is 30 percent greater for a refinery affiliated with another refinery that it
is for an unaffiliated refinery.
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Chapter 1
Product Differentiation In Gasoline
Markets: A Discussion of Regional
Gasoline Content Regulations
1.1 Introduction
Over the past several years, prices in US retail gasoline markets have fluctuated
significantly, punctuated by regional prices spikes in the Midwest and California.
The first of these regional spikes to receive significant attention occurred in Spring
2000 in Chicago and Milwaukee, where prices for reformulated gasoline rose from
$1.85 and $ 1.74 on May 30, 2000 to $2.13 and $2.02 a gallon on June 20, 2000 before
falling to $1.57 and $1.48 respectively by July 24, 2000.1 In contrast, the national
average price for reformulated gasoline over a similar period moved from $1.64 on
May 29, 2000 to $1.73 on June 19, 2000 and to $1.66 on July 24, 2000. Similar price
spikes occurred in the Midwest in Spring of 2001, and have occurred in California in
2000, 2001 and 2003.
These localized price spikes in US gasoline markets have created interest in under-
standing the factors underlying retail gasoline prices. In addition, interest also exists
'Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Midwest Price Spikes, March 21, 2001,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/03/mwgasrpt.htm.
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in identifying factors common across regional gasoline price spikes. For instance, one
cause of the high retail gasoline prices in Chicago and Milwaukee in Spring 2000 was
reported to be a Citgo refinery fire which "made it difficult to supply major hubs
like Chicago and Milwaukee with the special blends of reformulated gasoline that
are required by law in those cities."2 The Federal Trade Commission investigated
the production difficulties associated with the Spring 2000 price spike, in an attempt
to determine whether or not refineries able to produce reformulated gasoline were
withholding capacity to manipulate retail prices.3 In addition, a recent report by
the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations investigates the potential effect of market
structure and increasing concentration in many markets on price levels and volatility.4
1.1.1 What Drives Gasoline Prices
The studies responding to gasoline prices spikes identified factors that potentially
contribute volatile gasoline prices. Gasoline production costs, at a very basic level, are
driven by input prices (predominately crude oil prices), the cost to refine that crude
oil, and the cost to transport and distribute refined products to retail customers.
Moreover, short-run gasoline demand is relatively inelastic. Although consumers are
responsive to price competition between retail stations, overall demand for gasoline is
not strongly affected by the price of gasoline.5 This creates the potential for significant
2 Barboza, D., "Gasoline Prices Jump in Midwest, Hinting of Wider Price Spike", New York
Times, August 30, 2001.
3 See Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation, March
29, 2001. http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/03/midwest.htm.
4 See "Gas Prices - How Are They Really Set?", Majority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, Released in Conjunction with the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations'
Hearings on April 30 and May 2, 2002.
5 Recent estimates cited in Sipes and Mendelsohn (2001) of short-run elasticities vary from -0.35
to -0.51 and of long-run elasticities vary from -0.73 to -0.87. In addition, Dahl and Sterner (1991)
perform a meta-analysis across previous studies and calculated mean short-run price elasticities of
-0.26 and mean long-run price elasticities of -0.86 in studies with panel data. A more recent meta-
analysis performed by Espey (2001) finds that mean and median short run elasticities of-0.26 and
-0.23.
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volatility in gasoline prices, either in response to fluctuations in production costs, low
inventories caused by supply shocks or market power by refiners and wholesale dealers.
Over the past twenty years, three trends within the industry may have contributed
towards higher gasoline prices and more frequent price spikes. One significant change
has been a trend toward decreasing reserve refining capacity. In 1981, annual refinery
production was 68 percent of operable refinery capacity. Over the past twenty years,
the utilization rate for refining capacity increased dramatically - as old( refineries were
closed, no new refineries were built in response to rising demand for refined prod-
ucts.6 A second trend has been the general consolidation of the industry during the
late 1990's. Mergers in the petroleum industry include British Petroleum and Amoco
in 1998, Exxon and Mobil in 1999 and BP/Amoco and Arco in 2000. 7 Although reg-
ulatory approval for each merger required divestiture of overlapping refining assets,
changes in ownership may still affect gasoline prices. Third, state and federal regu-
lation of gasoline content increased differentiation of gasoline products or "blends".
Motivated by concerns about air pollution, the EPA and individual states have stipu-
lated a variety of regulations aimed at reducing the emissions from gasoline-powered
motor vehicles by specifying the gasoline content.
This paper focuses on the last of these trends, the trend toward greater regulation
of gasoline content. Increasingly incompatible gasoline content regulations affect gaso-
line prices in several important ways. First, content criteria impose costs not only on
refineries, but also on transporters and distributors of petroleum products. In order
to meet content regulations at the retail level, not only must gasoline be sufficiently
refined to meet the regulations, but it must be transported and stored without being
intermixed with other "blends". Second, since some content regulations must be met
though gasoline additives, gasoline supply becomes susceptible to supply shocks in
additive markets. Finally, content regulation reduces the fungibility of gasoline, that
6See Dazzo, N., Lidderdale, T., and N. Masterson, "U.S. Refining Capacity Utilization," Energy
Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Monthly.
7See "Gas Prices - How Are They Really Set?", Majority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, Released in Conjunction with the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations'
Hearings on April 30 and May 2, 2002 at pg 3.
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is, fewer refiners produce gasoline for regions with specific regulations. Not only does
this increase the potential for tacit collusion among refiners of a specific blend, but it
also increases the impact of unexpected outages on the supply of particular blends.
If a small set of refineries are producing a particular blend of gasoline, an outage
to any refinery in that set could lead to a large change in production, so long as
significant supply adjustment costs exist at the refinery level, limiting the extent to
which refiners adjust in the short run. In addition, since content regulations reduce
the substitutability of different "blends" of gasoline, it may be difficult to compen-
sate for a drop in production capacity by reducing inventories. Anecdotal evidence
supporting the relationship between product differentiation of gasoline and regional
price volatility is that the areas experiencing the most drastic prices changes in the
past several years, namely Chicago, Milwaukee and California, most strictly regulate
gasoline content.
This paper first addresses, in Section II, the nature of refining, with an empha-
sis on the elements related to gasoline content regulation. Section III provides a
summary of the history and implications of important federal and state regulations
pertaining to gasoline content. In Section IV, the paper discusses the potential direct
and indirect effects of content regulation, as mandated by federal and state govern-
ments, on the price levels and volatility of gasoline. Finally, Section V discusses the
analyses performed to-date of the potential effect of content regulation on price levels,
volatility and market power concerns. Section VI concludes.
1.2 Refining Process
To understand how gasoline content regulation affects the refining of crude oil, it is
necessary to understand refinery operation. The primary task of an oil refinery is to
separate crude oil into a wide variety of petroleum products, from gasoline to indus-
trial fuel to road tar. Crude oil is a mixture of different hydrocarbons, with between
1 and 60 carbon atoms per molecule, and amounts of other compounds containing
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sulfur, nitrogen and other elements.8 Hydrocarbons are classified by weight, that is,
the number of carbon atoms per molecule. Generally, the weight of a molecule pre-
disposes a hydrocarbon to a particular application. For example, gasoline contains
"lighter" products, with between 4 and 12 carbon molecules, while industrial No. 6
Fuel Oil is made up of "heavier" petroleum products with more carbon atoms per
molecule. The role of the refinery is threefold: (1) isolate "lighter" and "heavier" in-
termediate streams, (2) remove impurities, such as sulfur, and improve the quality of
the intermediate streams, and (3) blend the intermediate streams together to create
end-products with valuable properties.
It is important to note, though, that refiners have considerable flexibility when
processing crude oil. Through choices of input crude and the method of refining,
individual refiners can influence the achievable output mix. This section first discusses
how the choice of crude oil affects the output mix of a refiner and then addresses how
the equipment at a refinery can affect the mix of final products.
1.2.1 Choice of Crude Oil
The choice of crude oil is the first way a refiner can influence output mix. Crude oil
from different locations is a heterogeneous good. Based on the chemical makeup of
the crude oil, a particular refinery is limited in the blend of petroleum products it can
produce. Two standard metrics for differentiating crude oil are the API gravity weight
of the oil and the sulfur content.9 The API gravity weight of oil is correlated to the
relative proportion of shorter strings of hydrocarbons ("lighter" components) to long
strings of hydrocarbons ("heavier" components). This relative proportion of light and
heavy components dictates, at a basic level, the set of products a refinery can product
through simple distillation. If a refinery distills heavy oil, it will produce a greater
8 An in-depth discussion of the components of crude oil and gasoline can be found at
http://www.faqs.org/faqs/autos/gasoline-faq/partl/preamble.html.
9 Alternative metrics to API gravity degrees include specific gravity and density. See
http://pump.net/thebasics/equivdegrees.htm for a table translating API gravity into alternative
metrics.
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proportion of industrial products like fuel oil and coke than if a refinery distills light
oil. Thus, depending on the desired mix of end products and the technology of the
refinery (discussed in the next section), a refiner may choose to refine light or heavy
crude oil based on forecasted market prices.
The characteristics of the crude oil not only affect the proportions of the products
produced, but also the amount of processing that is required to transform the oil into
various products. For example, sulfur content specifies how much sulfur a particular
barrel of oil contains. Low-sulfur crude is termed "sweet" and high sulfur crude is
termed "sour". Refining sour oil, requires additional processing to remove sulfur from
end products to meet environmental or industrial standards. For example, fuel oil
sold for industrial use becomes more valuable as the sulfur content decreases.
1.2.2 Refinery Technology
Technology at refineries also allows a refiner to influence the mix of end-products
produced. Most refineries have several different types of equipment that allow the
refiner to separate, alter and purify the various components of crude oil. The basic
operating unit at any refinery is the distillation tower. The distillation unit separates
crude oil into component parts by heating the oil until the crude oil evaporates. The
evaporated crude oil is piped to the distillation tower where the oil begins to rise
through a series of filters. The temperature of the evaporated crude oil decreases
as it passes through each filter. Since "heavy" hydrocarbons condense at higher
temperatures than "light" hydrocarbons, the "heavy" hydrocarbons condense more
quickly than lighter components.10 By siphoning off the condensed material at each of
the different filters, the distillation tower roughly separates the crude oil into "light"
components and "heavier" components.11
1 0Generally, components from lightest to heaviest are butanes, naphtha, kerosene, distillate, vac-
uum distillate and residua.
lThe technology of the distillation tower affects the ability of a refiner to separate crude oil.
Distillation units which operate in a vacuum separate crude oil more effectively than "atmospheric"
distillation units.
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Although the gravity of oil determines the petroleum products created through
distillation, refineries also have equipment that can adjust and improve the mix of
end products after distillation. Three post-distillation units present at most large,
modern refineries are the (1) catalytic, thermal and hydro crackers, (2) reformers,
and (3) hydrotreaters. Cracking units adjusts the mix of outputs by "cracking" long
chains of hydrocarbons into shorter ones. This changes heavier products, like fuel
oil, into lighter and more valuable products like distillate and naphtha. With simple
distillation, approximately forty percent of crude oil can be made into light products.
The chemical properties of light products are more valuable than those of heavy
products - under most circumstances, refiners crack as much heavy product into light
product as possible, given the existing capital at a refinery.
Unlike the cracking unit, which alters the proportions of the output mix, the
reformer and hydrotreater improve the quality of intermediate streams, which are
then blended into finished products. The reformer changes the structure of naphtha
molecules without changing the number of hydrocarbons. Reforming changes low-
octane molecular structures into high-octane molecular structures (e.g. benzene),
which can then be blended into gasoline to improve quality. Hydrotreating also
improves products by removing impurities - in most cases sulfur - from a product.
Since the quality of crude oil affects the processing required, many refineries were
built to use local crude supplies.
Although the choice of crude oil drives what end products will be created, these
technologies allow a refinery to alter the final mix of products to a degree. For
example, simple distillation of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate crude oil yields
about 4/10 of a barrel of gasoline and 6/10 of a barrel of other petroleum products.
Cracking and reforming allow a barrel of crude to be separated into 2/3 of a barrel
of gasoline and 1/3 of a barrel of heating oil.12 In addition, depending on which
components of a barrel of crude oil are cracked, reformed or hydrotreated, a refinery
has considerable flexibility in adjusting the set of products in response to changes in
12Refiners and marketers often refer to the 3:2:1 crack spread - three barrels of crude can be made
into two barrels of gasoline and one barrel of heating oil.
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expected end-product prices.
1.2.3 Production Runs
While a refinery has considerable flexibility in manipulating and improving petroleum
products, planning must occur prior to refining due to the interconnected nature
of refining, cracking and reforming. In addition, the logistics for transporting and
purchasing crude oil and for transporting finished products require preparation. Since
it is costly to adjust inputs and output mixes on a day to day basis, refineries operate
around "production runs". Production runs are generally three to six weeks in length,
during which refiners hold input and output mix relatively constant. Planning for a
production run, begins two to three months in advance, when refiners contract for
crude oil with particular properties." Based on price forecasts, the refiner chooses
the set of outputs which maximize expected profit. As the production run gets closer,
the refiner finalizes the inputs. Just prior to the run, engineers finalize the planned
output mix, based on costs of inputs and updated expected prices of refined products.
After a production run begins, significant changes to production require the refinery
to reduce production and reconfigure the system of distilling, cracking, reforming and
hydrotreating.
1.3 Environmental Regulation of Gasoline
1.3.1 Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the chemical content of motor
fuels through Section 211 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), passed as part of the Clean
Air Act Amendment of 1990 (CAAA). Specifically, Section 211 grants the EPA the
power to "control or prohibit the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering
for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle, motor vehicle
engine or non-road engine or non-road vehicle" based on the emissions and health
'
3 Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Midwest Price Spike Investigation, March 29, 2001.
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consequences caused by a particular fuel.14 These regulations define both what must
be removed during the refining process and what can or must be added to the fuel,
prior to retail sale. Section 211 encompasses all regulations (1) specifying content of
fuels, such as sulfur limits on diesel fuel, (2) prohibiting additives, such as restrictions
on lead anti-knock agents in gasoline, and (3) mandating additives, such as detergent
requirements.
Five regulations in Section 211 outline specific requirements for motor gasoline:
(1) limitations on lead-based antiknock agents, (2) mandated detergent additives,
(3) limitations on the Reid Vapor Pressure, (4) mandated oxygen content, and (5)
the content of reformulated gasoline (RFG).15 To understand the potential impact
of each of these programs, Table 1.1 presents a three-part taxonomy, encompassing
geographic scope, temporal scope and method of implementation. The first element is
the geographic scope of the program. Like many regulations, some content regulations
apply nationally, while others apply only to particular regions. Regulations (1) and
(2) apply nationally, while (4) and (5) apply, by law, only to specified non-attainment
areas specified by the EPA. Program (3) contains both regional and national com-
ponents, placing a national requirement for all gasoline, and in addition, mandating
more stringent requirements for non-compliance areas. A second classification is the
temporal scope of the program. Due to the influence of temperature and sunlight
in the generation and formation of air emissions, certain programs apply seasonally,
while others apply year-round. Specifically, (1), (2), and (5) are year-round programs,
while (3) and (4) apply only seasonally. The final categorization is the method of
implementation of the regulation; that is, whether the regulation necessitates a pro-
cessing change by refiners or can be met with an additive added after the standard
refining process is complete. Programs (1), (2) and (4) can be met by additives alone,
while (3) and (5) require refinery-level adjustment.
14Clean Air Act, Section 211 (c)(1)
15Section 211 also mandates requirements for diesel fuel, such as sulfur limits.
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1.3.2 National Programs
Prohibition on Leaded Anti-knock Agents
The first, and perhaps most well-known, national regulation of gasoline content is
the prohibition on leaded anti-knock agents imposed by the EPA starting January
1, 1986.16 Since the 1920's, lead compounds were added to gasoline to increase
octane rating and to reduce the tendency of gasoline to "knock" or prematurely ignite
when compressed in an engine. Citing the known health effects of lead-based anti-
knock agents, the EPA began in 1973 to compel refiners to use non-leaded anti-knock
additives by slowly ratcheting down the acceptable lead content limits of gasoline.
The process culminated in 1986, when the EPA standard placed a nationwide limit of
0.1 gram per gallon on the amount of lead in gasoline, in contrast to the previous limit
of 1.1 gram per gallon. EPA regulation eventually ended the sale of leaded gasoline
in the United States.
Detergents
A second national program mandated by the CAAA of 1990 required refiners to add
detergents to gasoline beginning in January 1, 1995. l1 Detergents reduce the accu-
mulation of deposits in engines which decreases fuel efficiency and increase emissions.
Although the program is a national, year-round one, states have flexibility in the
choice of detergent additives, so long as they meet or exceed the emissions standards
defined by the EPA.
1.3.3 Regional Programs
In addition to the national regulations focused on phasing out lead-based antiknock
agents and limiting fuel system buildup in cars, the CAAA created three regional
programs: Low Reid Vapor Pressure gasoline, oxygenated gasoline and reformulated
16
"EPA Sets New Limits on Lead in Gasoline", EPA press release, March 4, 1986.
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lead/01 .htm
l7Clear Air Act, Section 211(1)
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gasoline. Te objective of the three programs was to reduce air emissions from
gasoline-powered engines. The objectives of oxygenated gasoline and reformulated
gasoline, in particular, were to reduce emissions in carbon monoxide or ozone non-
attainment areas. Non-attainment areas fail to meet EPA guidelines for air quality
based on ozone and carbon monoxide (CO) concentration. Two important allowances
of the CAAA contribute to the effect of each of these regional programs. First, states
and regions not required to participate in regional programs can "opt-in" to a pro-
gram and voluntarily adopt the EPA requirements. This increases the geographic
scope of oxygenated gasoline and reformulated gasoline significantly. 8 Second, the
CAAA only mandates minimum standards gasoline must meet. This allows cities and
states to impose more strict standards than the required federal standards.
Reid Vapor Pressure
The first of the regional programs, focusing on reducing ground-level ozone pollution,
is a cap on the Reid vapor pressure (RVP) of gasoline.1 9 Reid vapor pressure measures
the propensity of gasoline to evaporate, and increases with the amount of "light"
petroleum chains (eg. benzene or butane) in gasoline. In order to lower the RVP of
gasoline. it is necessary for refiners to filter out the lightest components, which have
the lowest boiling point and evaporate most easily. Limitations placed on gasoline
RVP reduce the amount of "fueling" pollution, evaporation that occurs as a gas
tank is filled. This significantly reduces the release of volatile organic compounds
(VOCs) and to a smaller extent the release of nitrogen oxides (NOx), which are
both precursors to ground-level ozone pollution. Since ground-level ozone formation
is positively affected by both temperature and sunlight, ozone formation is only a
problem during the summer. Thus, the RVP program is a seasonal program, in
contrast restrictions on lead anti-knock agents and required detergent additives. In
most cases, the "ozone season" begins May 1 and ends September 15. It is only over
18For example, populations of opt-in areas constitute over 1/3 of the total population of all areas
mandating reformulated gasoline.
19 Clear Air Act, Section 211(h)
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this period that the refiners are required to limit the vapor pressure of gasoline.
Phase I of the RVP regulations, effective Summer 1989, mandated a regional limits
varying from 10.5 psi to 9.0 psi based on the region of the country. Phase II, effective
Summer 1992, placed a national cap of 9.0 psi on gasoline RVP. To address the
regional variation in the severity of ozone pollution, the RVP requirements for Phase
II were more strict in ozone non-attainment areas. For non-attainment areas, Phase
II requirements varied from 7.8 psi to 7.0 psi throughout the summer ozone season. In
addition, in some locations requirements varied from month to month during the ozone
season, depending on the severity of the ground-level ozone pollution. In addition,
many areas tightened RVP requirements beyond the standards set by the EPA. For
example, Pheonix, Arizona has a state-placed limit of 7.0 psi which runs through
September 30 each year, rather than the federally-mandated September 15.20
The final note to make about Low RVP regulation is that reformulated gasoline
regulations place a limit on the benzene content of gasoline (although not RVP). In
many cases, the benzene limit is more restrictive than the RVP cap and, thus, RFG
regulations currently supersede Low RVP regulations in many metropolitan areas
of the country. Thus, RVP regulations currently only apply to areas which do not
participate in the reformulated gasoline program. 1
Oxygenated gasoline
The second regional program, effective November 1992, was intended to increase the
oxygen content of gasoline sold to consumers.2 2 Whereas reducing RVP lowers VOC
and NOx emissions, oxygenating gasoline enables an engine to burn gasoline more
completely, reducing Carbon Monoxide (CO) emissions. Once again, the method of
implementation, the temporal scope and geographic scope provide a starting point
from which to understand the potential effects of this regulation.
2°US Environmental Protection Agency, Guide on Federal and State RVP Standards for Conven-
tional Gasoline Only, EPA420-B-01-003, March 2001.
21See US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Mobile Sources, "Guidance on Use of Opt-in
to REG and Low RVP Requirements in Ozone SIPs," April 1, 1999.
22 Clean Air Act, Section 211(m)
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Unlike the Low RVP requirements that can only be met through processing at the
refinery, refiners use additives to increase the oxygen content of gasoline. The baseline
EPA requirement calls for 2.7 percent oxygenation by weight - this requirement can
be met by blending in one of several additives that increase oxygen content. The two
most common oxygenates are methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and ethanol. In
order to achieve the 2.7 percent baseline set by the CAAA, refiners or distributors
must either blend inl5 percent MTBE, derived from natural gas, or 8 percent Ethanol,
derived from renewable feedstocks such as corn stover or cellulose.
Like Low RVP regulation, baseline EPA requirements to oxygenate fuels have a
seasonal component. Carbon monoxide emissions from mobile sources are greatest
during the winter, as cold engines emit greater amounts of carbon monoxide. However,
ethanol increases the RVP of gasoline, and hence is detrimental to efforts focused
on reducing summer ground-level ozone pollution. While CAAA does not specify
outright a seasonal schedule for oxygenation, simply mandating a minimum duration
of four months per year, the EPA mandates winter oxygenation for all areas in CO
non-attainment. In general, refiners and distributors must oxygenate gasoline from
November through February.23
The geographic scope of the regulation has two important facets: (i) the areas
required to participate and (ii) state-level supplementary regulation mandating oxy-
genation requirements. First, unlike Low RVP requirements, no national oxygenation
requirements exist - only regions with in CO non-attainment must oxygenate gasoline.
The CAAA initially required oxygenated gasoline for 39 areas considered to be in CO
non-attainment for 1988 and 1989, as specified by the National Air Ambient Quality
Standards (NAAQS). The initial 39 non-attainment areas included CMSAs contain-
ing 87.5 million people. In addition, any region that failing to attain the NAAQS
standard for CO, must begin oxygenation during winter months specified by the EPA.
2 3For a comprehensive list of temporal requirements facing particular areas, see Lid-
derdale, Tancred; Areas Participating in the Oxygenated Gasoline Program; Energy
Information Administration, July 1999, Short-Term Energy Outlook Special Report.
ht tp://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/special/oxy2.html.
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Moreover, several areas in attainment, such as Portland, OR and Tuscon, AZ, vol-
untarily opted in through state-mandated programs. As regions reach attainment,
though, oxygenated gasoline is no longer required. Of the original 39 non-attainment
areas, areas containing approximately 46 million of the original 87.5 million people
have since come into CO attainment and have "opted out" of the oxygenated gasoline
program.
While the EPA mandates a baseline of 2.7 percent oxygen by weight and spec-
ifies a seasonal duration of the program for each area, the areas themselves may
constraint refiners' choice of oxygenate and may impose more stringent requirements
than those mandated by the EPA. In the case of oxygenation, additional regulation
is much more pervasive than in other programs. While some areas have imposed
more stringent oxygenation requirements (e.g. WA, NV, AZ all require 3.5 percent
oxygen consistent with blending 10 percent ethanol with gasoline) and more stringent
temporal requirements (MN requires year-round oxygenation), the greatest amount
of differentiation between state programs is generated by requirements over the choice
of oxygenate. Due to the need for a renewable feedstock (generally corn stover) to
produce ethanol, ethanol is used as an oxygenate in the Midwest while MTBE is used
primarily in the Northeast and California.24
Finally, several other aspects of oxygenation programs deserve mention. First, like
Low RVP regulations, reformulated gasoline has somewhat supplanted oxygenated
gasoline. The basic RFG formula specified by the CAAA requires 2 percent oxygen
by weight, which in many areas is sufficient to meet NAAQS standards. Currently,
only reformulated gasoline sold in New York City area must be oxygenated during the
winter beyond RFG requirements. Also, the CAAA also grants the EPA the ability
to provide a waiver from the 2.7 percent oxygen requirement for states where "the
use of oxygenated gasoline would prevent or interfere with the attainment by the area
2 4 California plans to phase out MTBE by December 31, 2002 due to health concerns. California
Executive Order D-5-99, March 25, 1999. http://www.energy.ca.gov/mtbe/index.html. In addition,
twelve other states have passed legislation to reduce or eliminate the use of MTBE as an oxygenate.
See "Gas Prices - How are they really set?" at 69.
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of a national primary ambient air quality standard for any air pollutant other than
carbon monoxide."2 5 Due to the additional volatility of oxygenated gasoline which
hampers efforts to reduce ground-level ozone, California restricts oxygen content to
1.8-2.2 percent.
Reformulated Gasoline (RFG)
The final regulation of gasoline content mandated by the CAAA is reformulated
gasoline.2 6 The most comprehensive legislation to control emissions through gaso-
line content, reformulated gasoline targets both NOx and VOC emissions (like Low
RVP regulation) and CO emissions (like oxygenated gasoline). The method by which
RFG reaches these goals is different from both oxygenated gasoline and Low RVP
regulations. Like the low RVP and oxygenation requirements, RFG regulation stip-
ulates explicit content criteria. The content requirements are similar to those stip-
ulated by the Low RVP regulation and oxygenation regulation - benzene is limited
to one-percent of total volume and oxygen content must be at least two percent of
weight. Thus, the content requirements are essentially a combination of the Low
RVP requirements and the oxygenation requirements. Unlike low RVP and oxygena-
tion regulations, RFG regulation also specifies "performance" standards, which are
emissions-based measurements that refiners have flexibility in meeting. The three
"performance" standards specify reductions of VOC emissions, NOx emissions and
toxic air pollutants (TAPs) emissions relative to the 1990 gasoline that must be met
by gasoline sold as RFG. Performance requirements allow refiners to improve gaso-
line emissions in the least-cost manner. RFG regulations also contain "anti-dumping"
restrictions for refiners. These prevent refiners from simply shifting gasoline compo-
nents that they would like to remove from reformulated gasoline to their conventional
gasoline.
Like RVP regulation, RFG standards have phased in over time, with the per-
formance standards becoming more strict in the second Phase. Phase I, effective
2 5Clean Air Act, Section 211(m)(3)
26 Clean Air Act, Section 211(k)
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January 1, 1995, necessitated reduce VOC and TAP emissions by fifteen percent as
part of the performance standards as well as meet content standards for benzene
and oxygenation. In addition, NOx emissions from reformulated gasoline could not
exceed those from the baseline 1990 gasoline. Phase II, effective January 1, 2000,
required twenty-five percent reductions in VOC and TAP emissions in addition to
the content standards. The NOx emissions are unchanged from Phase I to Phase II.
Thus, standards for reformulated gasoline became more stringent over time.
Once again, the taxonomy helps identify how the content regulation may affect
refining and distribution. RFG is a regional, year-round requirement - the CAAA ini-
tially required sale of reformulated gasoline in the nine severe ozone non-attainment
areas with 1980 populations in excess of 250,000. These nine areas (Baltimore,
Chicago, Hartford, Houston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York City, Philadelphia
and San Diego) constitute over 63 million people, or twenty-four percent of the to-
tal US population. In addition to these nine cities, any area reclassified as severe
non-attainment is required to shift from conventional to reformulated gasoline. For
example, Sacramento was reclassified as a severe ozone non-attainment area in the
summer of 1995 and was required to use reformulated gasoline beginning January 1,
1996.
Like other content regulations, though, areas in attainment can "opt-in" to the
reformulated gasoline program, adopting the content and performance requirements
for gasoline. While opt-in slightly increased participation in oxygenated gasoline and
Low RVP gasoline regulations, RFG opt-in areas greatly expanded the geographic
scope of RFG regulation. Since 1995, regions containing approximately 35 million
people have adopted the RFG content and performance regulations.2 7
While standards do not vary across different regions participating in the federal
RFG program (California's program will be discussed in the next section), partici-
pating regions can and do stipulate the use of particular oxygenates. Consistent with
the pattern of oxygenate use for oxygenated gasoline, reformulated gasoline in the
27For a comprehensive list of areas subject to RFG regulation, see
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/rfgarea.htm.
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Midwest is usually oxygenated with ethanol, while areas on the East and West coasts
traditionally oxygenate gasoline with MTBE.
CARB Gasoline
The final major regional gasoline content regulations are those promulgated by the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) regulating gasoline sold year-round in Cal-
ifornia.28 Beginning in 1992, California began a three phase state-run program reg-
ulating gasoline content. Content regulation in Phase I of the California program,
effective January 1, 1992, was consistent with federal low RVP and oxygenated gaso-
line programs introduced at the time, with the exception that California mandated
oxygen content of 1.8 - 2.2 percent by weight as opposed to the federal standard of
at least 2.7 percent oxygen by weight.
Phase II CARB gasoline replaced Phase I CARB gasoline in March 1996. CARB
Phase II regulations were similar to the federal regulations for reformulated gasoline
introduced in 1995. Like RFG regulation, most Phase II CARB regulations were
effective year-round (with the exception of the Low RVP limit). Phase II regulations
lowered the RVP limit from 7.8 psi to 7.0 psi, limited benzene content to 1 percent by
volume and mandated 1.8 to 2.2 percent oxygen content by volume. California regu-
lations covered the entire state, essentially opting-in areas already in ozone and CO
attainment (mainly Northern California). One significant difference, though, between
the CARB requirements and EPA RFG requirements was a limitation placed on sul-
fur content of gasoline by CARB. CARB Phase II requirements stipulate a fiat limit
of 40 ppnm sulfur on all gasoline. As discussed in the earlier section onil refining, sulfur
naturally occurs in crude oil and, when untreated, occurs generally at concentrations
of approximately 250 ppm in gasoline. This sulfur limit requires either skimming off
high-sulfur gasoline into the less valuable distillate pool or hydrotreating the gasoline
to remove sulfur during the refining process. In addition, CARB regulations only
imposed specific content requirements, unlike the relative "performance" standards
of federal RFG.
28Title 13, California Code of Regulations, Sections 2250-2273.
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Phase III CARB, going into effect for producers December 31, 2002 and for retail-
ers March 31, 2003, tightened limits on sulfur content to a flat limit of 20 ppm and
on benzene content to 0.8 percent by volume. In addition, phase III CARB gasoline
also prohibited the use of oxygenates other than ethanol to eliminate the use MTBE
due to health concerns.29 Citing fears of costly gasoline and the additional volatility
of ethanol, which leads to greater evaporative emissions of VOCs and NOx, Governor
Davis has appealed to EPA to waive the oxygenation requirement for California's
compliance with federal "minimum" RFG standards.3 0
From Gasoline to "Boutique Blends"
In 1991, gasoline across the country met similar content standards for lead and other
metals. In the past 10 years, environmental regulation has significantly changed the
substitutability of gasoline across different areas. Currently, there are fifteen "bou-
tique fuels", each satisfying content constraints for regional content requirements. 31
Increasing differentiation began in 1992, when national Phase II RVP limits lowered
gasoline volatility nationwide and summer RVP limits were placed on gasoline sold in
ozone nonattainment areas. In addition, in 1992, California instituted phase I CARB
gasoline. That winter, oxygenation of gasoline was required in CO non-attainment
areas. Like the RVP limits, required duration varied by noncompliance area. Some
areas in compliance opted-in to each of these programs, increasing participation. In
addition, various cities and states mandated stricter content requirements, specified
the use of particular oxygenates and lengthened the period of compliance.
Starting January 1, 1995, year-round reformulated gasoline requirements sup-
planted seasonal RVP limits and oxygenation requirements for the nine metropolitan
2 9 California Executive Order D-5-99, March 25, 1999. http://www.energy.ca.gov/mtbe/index.html.
In addition, twelve other states have passed legislation to reduce or eliminate the use of MTBE as
an oxygenate. See "Gas Prices - How are they really set?" at 69.
30" Governor Davis Sues US EPA Over Gasoline Additive", August 13, 2001.
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cbg/oxy/wav/oxywav.htm.
31Study of Unique Gasoline Fuel Blends, Effects on Fuel Supply and Distribution and Potential
Improvements, US Environmental Protection Agency. Appendix D.
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areas in severe ozone nonattainment. Once again, a significant number of areas in
attainment chose to adopt reformulated gasoline requirements. With the exception
of California, EPA regulations permitted regions to mandate the use of particular
oxygenates. While choice of oxygenates has little effect on refining when gasoline
must only meet a minimum oxygen content, different oxygenates have different prop-
erties. In order to meet "performance requirements" for NOx and VOC emissions,
RFG must be refined differently if it is going to be blended with ethanol or MTBE.
Thus, although the requirements for RFG are consistent across program areas with
the exception of California, choice of oxygenate has an impact on refining.
Effective March 1996, the California Air Resources Board tightened EPA require-
ments for reformulated gasoline, introducing both a summer RVP limit (on top of the
benzene limit in RFG) and a limit on sulfur content as part of the Phase II CARB
gasoline requirements. In addition, to other requirements Sulfur limits required for
gasoline sold in California further differentiated California gasoline from federal RFG
sold in other areas.
More strict standards for reformulated gasoline (Phase II RFG) went into effect
January 1, 2000. In addition, Phase III CARB gasoline further tightened requirements
ill California starting December 31, 2002. Thus, in a under a decade, the US gasoline
market became considerably more differentiated. In summary, Table 1.2 contains
a breakdown of the various content requirements imposed by the EPA and state
regulations. Table 1.3 details the geographic and temporal scope of reformulated
gasoline, oxygenated gasoline and CARB gasoline programs.
1.4 Costs of Gasoline Content Regulation
Adherence to gasoline content regulation increases the cost of gasoline directly. Costly
additives, such as ethanol, raise the average cost of producing a gallon of gasoline.
In addition, additives meant to reduce pollution dilute gasoline, lowering the energy
content and reducing fuel efficiency of automobiles. Moreover, content regulations can
affect costs associated with production, transportation and storage of gasoline. Low
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RVP, reformulated and CARB regulations force refiners to refine gasoline more than
they otherwise would, increasing production costs. Regulation of gasoline content also
imposes other costs on production and distribution of gasoline due to the inflexible
nature of refining, storage and transportation of gasoline.
The goal of this section is to identify how gasoline content regulation could affect
the price levels and price volatility of gasoline. This section first discusses the direct
costs of additives and the impacts of regulations on fuel efficiency. After addressing
these primary costs, potential costs imposed on refining, transportation and storage
infrastructure are summarized for the major regional content regulations: RVP limits,
oxygenation, RFG and CARB gasoline.
1.4.1 Direct costs of environmental regulation
Cost of oxygenation additives (Ethanol/MTBE)
The most direct cost imposed by content regulation is the cost of additives required to
meet certain fuel specifications. Oxygenation standards drive the majority of this type
of cost, since either 8 percent ethanol or roughly 15 percent MTBE must be blended
into gasoline to meet the 2.7 percent oxygen by weight minimum for oxygenated
gasoline. Since reformulated gasoline and CARB Phase II and III also stipulate a
minimum oxygen content, albeit lower than that required for oxygenated gasoline,
oxygenate costs also play a role in the prices for each of these types of gasoline.32
Historically, gasoline prices on a per gallon basis have been lower than MTBE prices
which have in turn been lower than ethanol prices. Hence, requiring oxygen be added
to gasoline most directly affects production costs by increasing the average cost of
the components constituting a gallon of gasoline.33
32 California sued the EPA over their application for a waiver for CARB
Phase III gasoline from federal RFG minimum oxygen content requirements.
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cbg/oxy/wav/oxywav.htm
3 3Gasoline blended with 10 percent ethanol (gasohol) is exempt from 5.4 cents of federal gasoline
tax. In addition, this exemption is prorated for gasoline containing less than 10 percent ethanol.
This translates into a 54 cent per gallon subsidy of the production and use of ethanol. Even with
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On top of the simple cost of oxygenates, mandating an oxygen content level also
introduces an additional input subject to production disruptions. While MTBE is
generally produced at petroleum refineries, ethanol plants located in the Midwest pro-
duce the vast majority of US ethanol. Depending on inventory levels of ethanol and
transportation costs, unexpected outages of ethanol plants may affect the supply of
ethanol and hence ethanol-blended gasoline. On top of the effect of unexpected out-
ages, production of ethanol is even more concentrated than crude oil refining. Thus,
stipulating an oxygen content level and especially stipulating a particular oxygenate
could lead to higher and more volatile gasoline prices.
Lower Fuel Efficiency
A less obvious effect of content regulation is an alteration of the energy content of
gasoline. By limiting certain petroleum products and requiring certain additives,
content regulation changes the amount of energy contained in a volume of gasoline,
thereby affecting mileage of cars. The two requirements which substantively affect
energy content are RVP limits and oxygenation. The RVP cap on gasoline limits the
volume of highly volatile petroleum products. These products contain relatively less
energy by volume than less volatile products - as a result, RVP limits increase energy
density in gasoline. In addition, since less fuel is lost through evaporation when
fileling, a 1 percent decrease in benzene levels roughly corresponds to a 0.25 percent
increase in engine efficiency. Adding oxygenates to gasoline, on the other hand,
dilutes the gasoline by adding lower energy density oxygenate. Due to the greater
percentages of oxygenates used, meeting EPA oxygenated gasoline requirements leads
to a 2 to 3 percent loss in engine efficiency. Reformulated and CARB gasoline, with
oxygen content and volatility limits, fall somewhere in between, with 1 to 2 percent
efficiency losses.34
this subsidy, though, historical ethanol prices have been higher than MTBE prices.
34 For more information about the effect of content regulation of efficiency, see Lidderdale, T.,
"Environmental Regulations and Changes in Petroleum Refining Operations", Energy Information
Administration, June 1998.
41
It is important to note, though, that both of these also affect the volume of gasoline
produced. For example, if gasoline is blended with ethanol, 100 gallons of gasoline
and 8 gallons of ethanol create 108 gallons of oxygenated gasoline. Thus, although
oxygenation reduces the energy content for each gallon of gasoline, the reduction in
energy content per gallon is compensated for by increasing the total volume. Hence,
the energy content of gasoline is not lost through oxygenation, but merely spread
over a greater number of gallons. Unless significant costs are associated with filling
gas tanks such that a 3-4 percent energy loss, and consequently an increase of similar
magnitude in the frequency of filling tanks, is significant, reductions in energy content
only need only be considered when comparing price levels of conventional gasoline
with price levels of various gasoline blends.
1.4.2 Refining costs
The nature of crude oil refining drives how gasoline content regulation affects the
refining industry. The primary effect of gasoline content regulation (specifically Low
RVP, reformulated gasoline and CARB gasoline) is the necessary increase in the
refinement of gasoline. That is, content regulation forces refiners to refine gasoline
more than they otherwise would in order to meet various standards.
Specifically, limits on the RVP of gasoline impose costs on refiners, since RVP can
only be reduced at the refinery level. Gasoline, like any petroleum product is made
up of a blend of different elements. To lower the RVP, it is necessary to isolate and
remove the components of gasoline which are the most volatile and hence most prone
to evaporation. This increases refiner production costs through additional refining
costs to remove these components as well as processing costs of these and other
components in order to maintain the volume of gasoline.
Likewise, reformulated gasoline regulation requires increased refining to remove
volatile components in gasoline. Although RFG requirements do not specify a par-
ticular RVP limit, they do constrain benzene levels at a maximum of 1 percent of
total volume. In addition, the VOC and TAP performance standards force refiners
to remove volatile elements of gasoline. This places a constraint similar to the RVP
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limit, forcing refiners to separate benzene and other volatile elements from the gaso-
line. Furthermore, state-mandate use of ethanol as an oxygenate places additional
costs of meeting the performance standards, to offset different chemical properties
of ethanol and MTBE. For example, the RVP of ethanol is higher than the RBP of
MTBE (18.0 psi versus 8.0 psi).35 Although ethanol's higher oxygen content allows
for it to be blended in lesser proportion to gasoline to meet oxygen content require-
ments, it nonetheless increases the RVP of gasoline by about psi when blended to
satisfy the requirements of RFG. Refiners required to use ethanol must remove more
benzene and other volatile components from the gasoline so the blend satisfies the
performance standards for NOx and VOCs.
CARB regulations cap the volatility of gasoline and require oxygenation, creating
similar costs for refiners producing CARB gasoline to costs for refiners producing
reformulated gasoline. In addition, CARB gasoline also must not exceed a set sulfur
content. This forces refiners to either remove sulfur from gasoline by hydrotreating
or using more expensive low-sulfur crude.
To understand the effect of refining constraints imposed by content regulation, I
separate the effects into two categories: (1) those for which adjustments can be made
during the next production run and (2) those which require investment by a refiner.
For example, small adjustments in Reid vapor pressure can be easily made through
changes in the refining process. Once a refiner has produced low RVP gasoline, no
major investment is required to blend the gasoline with MTBE, and still meet RFG
performance requirements. However, if the gasoline must be blended with ethanol,
refiners must invest in order to produce gasoline with extremely low volatility. While
these investments are not extremely costly, only refiners serving RFG markets requir-
ing ethanol as an oxygenate made the investments prior to the start of Phase II RFG.
Other refiners "have not made such facility changes because they have little reason to
undertake these changes for the markets they traditionally serve."3 6 Similarly, refin-
35See Gomez J., T. Brasil and N. Chan, "An Overview of the Use of Oxygenates in Gasoline",
California Air Resources Board, September 1998. http://www.arb.ca.gov/cbg/oxy/oxy.htm.
36 Shore, J., "Supply of Chicago/Milwaukee Gasoline, Spring 2000", Energy Information Admin-
istration, Petroleum division
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ers producing CARB gasoline must hydrotreat large quantities of gasoline to remove
sulfur. While many refineries already can hydrotreat significant amounts of diesel
fuel, many do not have the capacity to also hydrotreat large amounts of gasoline.
The effect of national and state-specific content regulation has been to separate
the homogenous gasoline market of 1991 into smaller gasoline "islands", each of which
is a small market for gasoline satisfying particular content requirements. Whether
or not refiners can adjust their production process from one production run to the
next determines the ability of the refining industry to adjust to production shocks
in the sub-markets. I the case of ethanol blended RFG or CARB gasoline, refinery
investment or substantial production costs limit the number of refiners not regularly
serving those markets that can respond to supply shocks within those markets. Due
to the costs involved to producing either CARB gasoline or an RFG blend to be mixed
with ethanol, California and Chicago/Milwaukee are the best examples of gasoline
islands" .3 7
With a greater number of markets and fewer refiners fully committed to each
market, content regulation has the potential to both increase industry vulnerability
to refinery outages and increase the potential for refiners in a particular sub-market
to exercise market power. In fact, both of these have been proposed as contributing
factors to the gasoline price spikes in the Midwest in 2000 and in California in 2001.
With fewer refiners able to adjust production to meet the specifications of particu-
lar gasoline blends, unplanned outages for maintenance contributes to greater price
volatility. In addition, to the extent that certain refineries are more efficient than oth-
ers, necessary investment may lead a less efficient refinery (say in Chicago) to increase
production in the event of a fire at a larger Midwest refinery when, but-for the content
regulation, a larger refinery in the Gulf Coast might have increased production. In
addition, if it is difficult for refineries to switch between the production of different
blends, less competitive pressure is brought to bear on markets with relatively few
37 See Statement of John Cook, Director, Petroleum Division USDOE Energy Information Ad-
ministration before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air
Quality, US House of Representatives, May 15, 2001.
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refiners. Each of these problems only becomes more acute as reserve refinery capacity
decreases over time, as it has been over the last 20 years.
In summary, content regulation has several distinct effects on refining that could
increase gasoline price levels and volatility. The most direct method is from the cost of
the additional refining necessary to meet to content standards of a particular blend.
If adjusting refining processes to meet different criteria was costless, no additional
costs would be imposed on refiners. In actuality, significant costs exist, either from
investment necessary to meet content standards or from the adjustment costs asso-
ciated with altering the production plan in the midst of a production run. These
costs create gasoline "islands", smaller markets served by a small group of refineries.
Since it is costly, in many cases, for refiners to switch from producing one blend to
another, even at the end of a particular production run, content regulation also has
the potential to influence price levels and volatility by magnifying the effects of an
unexpected refinery outage or by reducing the competitive pressure on small groups
of refiners producing a particular blend of gasoline.
1.4.3 Transportation costs
Content regulation for gasoline also has ramifications for the transportation of gasoline
from refiners to wholesale terminals, after which the gasoline is distributed to retailers.
Gasoline is transported to wholesale terminals either through pipeline or by barge
depending on the locations of the refinery and terminal. In order to ensure that
shipped fuel meets specification both before and after transportation, different blends
of gasoline must not mix to a great degree. This is relatively easy to do using barges
but becomes more difficult using a pipeline which must be full of product in order
to operate. As is the case with different grades of gasoline, pipelines are often filled
with higher quality (lower emission) product first and lower quality (higher emission)
product second. With many different refineries and many different locations requiring
gasoline, transportation costs may increase as a result of content regulation.
On top of additional transportation costs incurred when transporting the gasoline,
RFG, CARB and oxygenation regulations also necessitate transportation of additives.
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While refiners often produce and mix MTBE with gasoline at the refinery, refiners can-
not do this when blending with ethanol for two reasons. Ethanol is produced through
sugar fermentation and distillation, which does not happen at the refinery. Also, and
more importantly, chemically ethanol is has an affinity for water.38 If ethanol mixed
with gasoline comes into contact with water, the ethanol will separate from the gaso-
line and combine with the water. Sufficient water exists in product pipelines such that
refiners cannot mix gasoline and ethanol at the refinery and then transport the blend.
Instead, the operator of the wholesale terminals must blend ethanol with gasoline at
the wholesale terminal. This requires ethanol to be transported to wholesale termi-
nals rather than refiners. This becomes more costly as the number of areas requiring
ethanol to be blended with gasoline increases. For example, California's prohibition
on the use of MTBE as an oxygenate went into effect December 31, 2002. Under the
federal oxygen content regulations for RFG, California will need 660 million gallons
of ethanol annually. With year to date US production averaging 128 thousand barrels
per day, this amounts to roughly one-third of current US ethanol production. 39 Not
only must this be produced, but it must also be transported to wholesale terminals
in California and blended there.
1.4.4 Storage costs
The final way content regulation can affect the price level and volatility of gasoline
via infrastructure is through additional storage costs. Depending on the specific reg-
ulation, several potential costs might exist. Clearly, additive-induced transportation
costs imply analogous storage costs. Regardless of who blends the additives with the
gasoline, storage must exist for the additives at that location as well as the machinery
3 8See Gomez J., T. Brasil and N. Chan, "An Overview of the Use of Oxygenates in Gasoline",
California Air Resources Board, September 1998 for chemical characteristics of oxygenates used in
gasoline.
3 9 Energy Information Administration, EIA-819M, Monthly Oxygenate Telephone Report, Table
B1, August 2002.
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to blend additives into gasoline.40 In addition, as is the case with different grades of
gasoline, different content blends must be stored separately. For instance, if a whole-
sale terminal sells several "blends", it needs separate tanks to maintain content and
"performance" requirements of the gasoline. Not only does this create costs for facil-
ities that store several types of gasoline, but it also reduces regional storage capacity
for either "blend" which potentially affects market response to supply shocks. Finally,
storage costs can also arise due to the seasonal nature of some content regulations,
since tanks must be either drained fully or filled several times before stored gasoline
will meet specifications. As a result, both retailers and wholesale distributors draw
down gasoline levels in storage tanks significantly prior to seasonal changes in gasoline
content requirements. While this does not impose any storage costs, in itself, it does
draw down inventories, making retail prices more susceptible to shocks.
1.5 Past Literature on the Effect of Gasoline Con-
tent Regulation
In August 2001, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Christie
Whitman, suggested that "limiting the number of 'boutique blends' to three or four
formulas could increase fuel supplies and help prevent large spikes in the prices drivers
see at the pump."41 Despite recognition of the potential effects of content regulation
on gasoline price levels and volatility, relatively little empirical work has assessed the
effects of content regulation on prices and the ability of refiners and wholesalers to
wield market power. No work was found to empirically address the effect of any
form of content regulation on price volatility. Nor has any work looked at the effect
of decreasing reserve refinery capacity. In addition, none of these analyses attempt
to empirically identify which factors, discussed in the previous section, increase or
decrease price levels. This section summarizes the work looking at the effect of content
4 California terminals' inability to store and blend large amounts of ethanol was noted in CARB
report, "An Overview of the Use of Oxygenates in Gasoline". September 1998.
41 "EPA mulls limiting number of special gasoline blends", The Associated Press, 8/6/01
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regulation first on price levels and then looks at investigations of market power.
1.5.1 Literature on Price Levels
Papers evaluating the effect of content regulation on price level can be categorized
into ex-ante estimates and ex-post analyses. Ex-ante estimates generally focus on the
incremental costs to refiners from producing various blends of gasoline, and occasion-
ally estimate the overall effect on prices. The ex-post analyses empirically quantify
the actual effect of content regulation on retail or spot price levels.
Ex-ante estimates
EIA and EPA studies provide the majority of ex-ante estimates of the costs of var-
ious content regulations. Prior to the start of oxygenated gasoline regulations, EIA
estimated the additional cost of oxygenates would lead to a three to five cent increase
in the spot price of oxygenated gasoline relative to conventional gasoline.4 2 In 1994,
EIA performed a similar analysis for Phase I and Phase II reformulated gasoline.
For Phase I RFG, EIA estimated up to a four cent differential between spot prices
of conventional and reformulated gasoline.43 For Phase II RFG, EIA estimated that
compliance with Phase II regulations would not add to the price premium in the
winter, but would add between 1 and 1.5 cents relative to Phase I RFG during the
summer. This was based on the expectation that refiners would be able to comply
more easily with Phase II regulations during the winter, when volatility was less of
a concern. Based on these estimates and the observed wholesale price premium of
2.5 cents between Phase I RFG and conventional gasoline, EIA estimated a price
premium of 2.5 cents during the winter months and 3.5 to 4 cents during the summer
months.44 The EIA estimates were roughly consistent with EPA estimates for Phase
42 Lidderdale, T., "Demand, Supply and Price Outlook for Oxygenated Gasoline," Energy Infor-
mation Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, June 1992.
43 Lidderdale, T., "Demand, Supply and Price Outlook for Reformulated Motor Gasoline 1995,"
Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, July 1994.
44 Bohn, A., and T. Lidderdale, "Demand and Price Outlook for Phase II Reformulated Gasoline,
2000," Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook Update, April 1999 to
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I RFG - the EPA initially estimated Phase I reformulated gasoline would lead to
additional costs of three cents per gallon. In addition, they estimated that CARB
gasoline regulations would create additional costs of eight to eleven cents per gallon.45
Ex-post analyses
Several studies by the EPA and one academic article evaluate the ex-post effects of
the first several years of content regulation. It is important to note, though, that
no study attempts to isolate the effect of content regulation controlling for either
increasing industry concentration or changes in refining reserve capacity. Since the
time frame for each study is relatively small and prior to most significant industry
consolidation, though, these issues are likely to be relatively small.
Lidderdale performs an ex-post analysis of the wholesale price premium for Low
RVP gasoline, oxygenated gasoline and RFG at major supply and refining centers.
Specifically, for each content regulation he averages spot or wholesale prices over the
relevant season on an annual basis. He uses this average as an estimate for the price
premium in the wholesale market. In addition, for seasonal programs such as Low
RVP regulation and oxygenated gasoline, Lidderdale begins his averaging window one
month early to account for the transportation lag between spot markets and retail
markets, where content specifications must ultimately be met.46
Lidderdale finds that for summer seasons from 1993 through 1998, waterborne
Gulf Coast spot prices for 7.8 psi RVP unleaded regular gasoline annually averaged
between 0.33 cents and 0.79 cents higher that 9.0 psi RVP gasoline at the same
location. Using a similar methodology, Lidderdale finds that for the three winter
seasons from 1992-1993 to 1994-1995, the price premium for wholesale, oxygenated
August 1999.
45US Environmental Protection Agency, "The Case for California Reformulated Gasoline - Adop-
tion by the Northeast", Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, May 1993.
4 6 The averaging window for Low-RVP gasoline and oxygenated gasoline is April 1 through August
3:L and October 1 through February 29 respectively in contrast to EPA mandate that generally re-
quires Low RVP gasoline from May 1 through September 15 and oxygenated gasoline from November
1 through February 29.
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gasoline at New York Harbor and the Gulf Coast annually averaged between 2.9
and 7.0 cents. The annual average reformulated gasoline price premium at the same
locations from 1995 through 1998 varies between 1.9 cents and 3.5 cents. The price
premia are, as expected, highly correlated with the price differential between MTBE
and conventional gasoline. Lidderdale performs a similar analysis of wholesale price
premia for CARB gasoline and finds that from January 1997 to December 1998, the
average pipeline spot premium for CARB gasoline relative to conventional gasoline
was 4.2 cents in Los Angeles and 4.3 cents in San Francisco.
Vita addresses the affect of divorcement regulation, preventing integration of re-
finers and retailers, on gasoline prices from 1995 through 1997.47 Using a panel of
average monthly retail prices net of taxes for each state, he regresses price in a partic-
ular month for a particular state on demand variables, cost variables and regulatory
variables, capturing whether or not a state had divorcement regulation. Included in
his model specification as cost-shifting variables, though, are variables indicating the
percentage of gasoline sold meeting oxygenated and RFG requirements. In addition,
he includes a dummy variable for California after May 1, 1996, to capture the affect
of CARB gasoline, and interacts it with a 1997 year-dummy to control if costs of
producing CARB gasoline have fallen over time.
Depending on how his regression is specified, Vita estimates a retail price premium
of 0.55 to 1.21 cents per gallon for a state required to oxygenate all of their gasoline
relative to a state using strictly conventional gasoline. His estimates also imply a 1.52
to 2.18 cent retail premium for CARB gasoline, holding all else constant. Interestingly,
the estimation of the effect of reformulated gasoline on price levels is the opposite of
the expected effect. He estimates a state requiring reformulated gasoline pays 0.19 to
0.35 cents per gallon less than a state with conventional gasoline.
47 Vita, M., "Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact
of Gasoline Divorcement Policies", Journal of Regulatory Economics, 18:3 217-233, 2000.
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1.5.2 Price Spikes and Price Volatility
The gasoline "price spikes" of the last several years prompted three investigations
into the behavior of refiners and market participants, an investigation by the FTC of
the price spikes in the Midwest during 2000, a similar investigation by the FTC into
gasoline pricing in Western States, and an report by the US Senate Subcommittee on
Investigations. In addition, the DOJ has studied antitrust concerns in the market for
ethanol production. While the investigations focus on whether or not explicit collu-
sion among participants occurred, each investigation discusses the role that content
regulation may play in creating the price spikes.
FTC Midwest Price Spike Investigation
After the retail gasoline price spikes in Chicago and Milwaukee during May and June
2000, the FTC began an investigation of the behavior of market participants leading
up to the price spikes.4 8 The FTC found that while market participants may have
unilaterally acted in their best interest, there was no evidence of explicit collusion
by firms to manipulate the retail price, and hence no violation of antitrust statutes.
Evidence suggested that "prices rose both because of factors beyond the industry's
irammediate control and because of conscious (but independent) choices by industry
participants."4 9 As part of the report, though, the FTC did identify three primary
factors in the price spike, namely, refinery production problems, pipeline disruptions
and inadequate inventories. Of the factors identified by the FTC, several can be traced
to content regulation. First, content regulation complicated the production of Phase
II RFG (especially that produced for Chicago and Milwaukee requiring ethanol), as
refiners had difficulty meeting the new standards for Phase II. In addition, the re-
quirement to use ethanol as an oxygenate in Chicago and Milwaukee reduced the
ability of other refineries to substitute MTBE-blended Phase II RFG for the Chicago
and Milwaukee blend. Finally, in order to meet the Phase II RFG standards, refiners
48 Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation, March
29, 2001.
4 9See Executive Summary of Final Report of the FTC.
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and wholesale distributors needed to drain tanks to prevent Phase II compliant and
non-phase II complaint gasoline from commingling. This led to low inventories, in-
creasing the susceptibility of the industry to reduced pipeline availability and delays
bringing refineries back from maintenance.
FTC Western Price Investigation
In addition to the FTC investigation of the Midwest price spikes, the FTC also
investigated the production and distribution practices of major refiners in the Western
states of Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.5 0 Again, the FTC
found no evidence of explicit collusion between refiners. Once again, though, the
FTC investigation identified "unique product requirements, such as gasoline satisfying
California Air Resources Board standards" as an important factor contributing to the
differences in price between the gasoline market in the West and in the rest of the
US.
US Senate Subcommittee Investigation
The final, and largest, investigation was a US Senate Subcommittee investigation
addressing "whether the increased concentration has contributed to the price spikes
and increases."5 1 The goal of this investigation was not to ascertain whether or not
explicit collusion had occurred, but rather to evaluate the factors underlying the re-
tail price spikes of the last several years. The findings of the subcommittee identify
both increasing concentration and declining reserve capacity as factors underlying the
retail price spikes of the last several years. While they noted "the current gasoline
production and distribution system is able provide adequate quantities of boutique
fuels," they also remarked that "in the event of a supply disruption or shortage, it may
be more difficult to bring in additional supply to an area that requires a boutique fuel
rather than a conventional fuel, because fewer refiners may be readily capable of pro-
50See Statement of Commissioners Anthony, Swindle and Leary Concerning Western States Gaso-
line Pricing Investigation. May 7, 2001.
5 1 See "Gas Prices - How Are They Really Set?" at pg 17.
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ducing the required gasoline."5 2 In addition, the investigation specifically identifies
seasonal storage transition issues as a contributor to the Midwestern price spikes of
2000 and 2001. Thus, although the investigations of the FTC and Senate Subcommit-
tee do not attempt to quantify the effect of content regulation, they do acknowledge
that content regulation has played a role in recent price spikes.
1.6 Conclusion
To address the increased volatility of gasoline prices over the past several years, three
important industry trends must be incorporated into any analysis. First, over the
past ten years, the industry has significantly consolidated. While consolidation was
conditional on divestiture of overlapping refining and retailing assets, significant refin-
ing resources have been purchased and sold. While apriori the effect of consolidation
with divestiture is ambiguous, this must be nonetheless incorporated into any anal-
ysis. Second, since the early 80's, refining capacity has not increased at the same
rate as demand. As in the case of the electricity industry, reserve refining capacity
provides backup refining in the case of unexpected refinery outages. Depending on
the degree to which inventories and the transportation system are able to compensate
for unexpected outages, this may or may not play a role in the high gasoline prices of
the past several years. Thus, declining reserve refining capacity also must be taken
into account in any analysis of gasoline pricing. Finally, federal and state regulations
now mandate distinct blends of gasoline for different regions of the country. These
regulations have the potential to impose significant costs on refineries, pipelines and
storage terminals. Moreover, content regulations reduce the fungibility of gasoline
across different, but often nearby, areas. This reduces the ability of refiners and mar-
keters to substitute gasoline between locations in response to unforeseen supply and
demand shocks. It is these regulations which at least at first glance, are the most
directly related to price volatility since over the past several years, the two regions
with the most volatile gasoline prices have both had a unique blend of gasoline.
52See "Gas Prices - How Are They Really Set?" at pg 74-75.
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The effects of each of these trends have clear policy implications. Almost 130
billion gallons of gasoline were sold at the wholesale level in the United States dur-
ing 2000.53 To the extent that any of these trends creates a cost that is avoidable
(e.g., through standardization of content regulation), large potential savings exist.
In addition, if the goal of content regulation is to reduce air pollution in particular
areas, it is also informative to determine whether content regulation represents a rel-
atively efficient or inefficient way of reaching that goal. A number of existing and
potential policy tools, including fuel-economy regulation, vehicle emissions standards,
emission-based registration fees, and premature vehicle retirement, could substitute
as a policy tool for reducing air emissions. An important question, given the po-
tential costs of content regulation, is whether alternative policies provide a more
cost-effective method of reducing local emissions.54 Alternatively, if significant effects
are traced to declining reserve capacity, other policy tools could potentially address
those costs. The quantification of the effects and evaluation of the relative efficiencies
of the policies provides a question and focus for future research.
5 3EIA Petroleum Marketing Annual, 2000, Table 48.
54 See Harrington, Walls and McConnell (1994) for estimates of the cost-effectiveness of various
policies to reduce motor vehicle emissions.
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Chapter 2
Gasoline Price Spikes and Regional
Gasoline Content Regulations: A
Structural Approach
2.1 Introduction
Much recent interest in gasoline prices has focused on regional gasoline price spikes.
These price spikes are limited in geographic scope from the city-level to the size
of several states. That is, gasoline prices might rise and then fall dramatically in a
particular city or state, while the prices in nearby areas do not change. One such price
spike occured in Chicago and Milwaukee in May and June, 2000. From May 30 to June
20, average prices of reformulated gasoline in Chicago and Milwaukee rose from $1.85
and $1.74 a gallon to $2.13 and $2.02 a gallon. By July 24, gasoline prices dropped to
$1.57 and $1.48 respectively.' In contrast, the national average price for reformulated
gasoline during the same period varied less, rising from $1.64 on May 29, 2000 to
$1.73 on June 19, 2000 and finally dropping back to $1.66 on July 24, 2000.2 Similar
price spikes can be identified in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 shows the monthly
average wholesale price for gasoline sold in the Chicago MSA and in California. In
1Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Midwest Price Spikes, March 21, 2001
2 EIA Motor Gasoline Watch; May 29, 2000; June 19, 2000; July 24, 2000.
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addition, Figure 2.1 also plots the price of reformulated gasoline in Texas as well as
the most closely tracked domestic spot price for crude oil, West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) delivered to Cushing, OK. Figure 2.2 displays the differential between the two
gasoline price series and the WTI crude spot price.
In Figure 2.2, price spikes in California and Illinois are apparent. Prior to 1999,
wholesale gasoline prices in California and Illinois were, with a few exceptions, ten
to thirty cents per gallon more expensive that the WTI crude spot price. Beginning
in early 1999, though, wholesale prices in California and Illinois began to increase
periodically above this established range. From January 1999 to December 2003,
wholesale gasoline prices in Illinois spiked to more than forty cents per gallon above
the WTI crude spot price on four occasions, with the largest spike, in Spring 2000,
when gasoline prices spiked to over 70 cents per gallon above the WTI crude spot
price. Over a similar period, California wholesale gasoline prices spiked over forty
cents per gallon above the WTI spot price on nine occasions.
In response to volatile gasoline prices, several academic papers along with research
by the FTC, EPA, Senate Subcommittee on Investigations and state commissions
qualitatively analyzed structural changes in regional gasoline markets contributing to
these spikes.3 These studies identify three structural changes in the gasoline markets
that increase the frequency and magnitude of regional price spikes: (1) inconsistent
gasoline content regulations across different geographic regions, (2) declining reserve
refining capacity, and (3) industry consolidation within the oil industry. In addition,
these studies often identify incident-specific factors, including refinery outages, trans-
portation constraints, reductions in product inventories, or transition costs associated
with meeting new environmental regulations.
All studies identify the first factor, regional content regulations, as an important
structural change in gasoline markets related to regional price spikes. Over the past
ten years, state and local regulations defining local gasoline content have reduced the
fungibility of the domestic gasoline supply. In 1990, domestic gasoline met a single
3See for instance, Bulow, Creswell, Fischer and Taylor (2003) and "Gasoline Prices - How Are
They Really Set?" (2002)
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set of content standards. Ten years later, over fifteen different, and in some cases,
mutually exclusive, blends of gasoline are mandated in different geographic areas.
A simple model of quantity competition suggests content regulation likely has three
distinct effects on gasoline prices. First, blends of gasoline meeting content regulations
are more costly to refine than conventional gasoline. Second, additional refining costs
associated with state-specific content regulations might influence which geographic
regions refiners choose to serve. Finally, incompatible blends of gasoline may reduce
the ability of refiners and marketers to move gasoline between geographic regions in
response to supply and demand shocks. The first two are persistent effects and would
increase average gasoline prices, but would have little effect on price volatility. The
third, on the other hand, only affects prices in the event of an unexpected supply
or demand shock. The effect of the third, though, depends crucially on the degree
of geographic differentiation across regions sharing compatible fuel standards. For
example, little gasoline meeting federal reformulated gasoline (RFG) standards is
sold in the Midwest. Even if gasoline in Illinois and Milwaukee were compatible
with federal RFG, transportation costs from locations producing federal RFG might
be sufficient to limit shipments from other RFG producing areas in response to a
local shock in the Chicago gasoline market. In this case, transportation cost between
geographic markets rather than the product heterogeneity contributes to price spikes
resulting from a local shock.
While previous government and academic studies identify factors which contribute
to regional price spikes, no study quantifies the effect of the various factors. This
paper answers this question by providing a structural method which allows me to dis-
tinguish the effect of product heterogeneity due to incompatible content regulations
from the effect of geographic differentiation created by transportation costs. In par-
ticular, I focus on the effects on price levels and price spikes of the two most stringent
regional blends of gasoline, ethanol-blended RFG sold in Chicago and Milwaukee and
California Air Resources Board (CARB) gasoline sold throughout California. In ad-
,dition to analyzing the effect of these regional gasoline content regulations, I simulate
counterfactuals controlling for refinery consolidation and declining reserve refining
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capacity. These simulations estimate the role changes in refinery ownership and the
slow growth of refining capacity have on wholesale gasoline prices.
To quantify each of these effects, I specify a structural model of the refining in-
dustry based on the production optimization problem faced by individual refineries,
allowing for unobservable cost, conduct and elasticity parameters. Although the like-
lihood function for the structural model cannot be expressed in closed form, I numeri-
cally search for values of the unobservable parameters in the model that minimize the
squared error between the solution to the optimization problem and actual market-
level production. Using values for parameters from the NLLS search algorithm, I
then simulate prices of wholesale gasoline in Illinois, Wisconsin and California as
if the states sold federal RFG instead of ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline.
This approach controls for transportation costs, refinery capacity constraints, changes
in refinery ownership and gasoline compatibility. In order to distinguish the effects of
content regulations on price levels and price volatility, I build a dataset of unexpected
refinery outages. The set of refinery outages allows me to identify months with and
without unanticipated local supply shocks and hence months in which local gasoline
content regulations affect prices in Illinois, Wisconsin and California through only
increased production costs. Comparing simulated prices in months with and without
local refinery outages separately identifies the effects of additional production costs
of CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG from the effects of incompatibility with
federal RFG.
Section 2 discusses the relevant economic literature. Section 3 provides a back-
ground on content regulations and the refining industry, focusing in particular on why
regulation of gasoline content and refinery outages effect wholesale gasoline prices and
the relationship between the effects. Section 4 details the data used and section 5
presents reduced-form estimates of the effect of content regulations on price levels.
In section 6, I propose a model of gasoline refining which allows me to estimate the
effect of content regulations on regional price spikes and then estimate unobservable
parameters of the model in section 7. In Section 8, I specify my primary counterfac-
tual and simulate the effect of the content regulations on regional wholesale gasoline
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price volatility. In addition, I also simulate alterative counterfactuals and test the
robustness of the results to both modelling assumptions and the coefficients of the
estimated structural parameters. Section 9 concludes.
2.2 Previous Literature
This paper addresses two aspects of regional gasoline prices: (i) regional price volatil-
ity, changes in prices over time and (ii) price dispersion, differences in prices across
state or regional markets. Several strands of literature relate to the topic and ap-
proach in this paper.
A considerable number of papers study gasoline price adjustment in response to
shocks. These studies identify two empirical regularities observed in gasoline markets:
prices are sticky, and prices adjust asymmetrically upwards and downwards. Explana-
tions for the former include supply adjustment costs (Borenstein and Shepard, 2000),
or menu-cost adjustment (Davis and Hamilton NBER 2003). The literature on asym-
metric price adjustment focuses on crude oil price shocks (Borenstein, Cameron and
Gilbert, 1997, and Bacon, 1991), but also addresses differences in search costs asso-
ciated with different petroleum products (Johnson, 2002).
A second strand of literature estimates reduced-form effects of state-level regula-
tory policies, including divorcement regulation (Vita, 2000), self-service bans (Vande-
grift and Bisti, 2001 and Johnson and Romeo, 2000), and sales-below-cost laws (An-
derson and Johnson, 1999). These studies exploit cross-state variation in regulation
or within-state changes in regulation over time, to estimate the effect of regulations
on price levels.
This paper departs from a strictly reduced-form approach used in previous studies
in favor of a structural approach like that used in Considine (2001) and Considine
and Heo (2002), specifying a structural model based on the production optimization
problem faced by individual domestic refineries. These studies incorporate a multi-
product optimal production problem of refiners into a structural model, considering
refinery production of not only gasoline, but also jet fuel, distillate and other prod-
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ucts. Unlike Considine and Considine and Heo, which aggregate individual refiner
behavior up to national prices and inventories, this paper optimizes the production
decisions for individual refineries choosing quantities of products at the state-product
level. I also model the production choice of individual refineries incorporating refinery
supply adjustment costs associated with rapid changes in refinery production identi-
fied in Borenstein and Shepard (2000). This approach allows me to control for factors
that affect regional price levels and volatility, but are difficult to incorporate in a
reduced-form approach, including refinery production constraints, changes in refinery
ownership, transportation costs and substitutability of different refined products.
In addition to estimating the effect of regulations on price levels and spikes, this
paper also identifies the extent to which product heterogeneity and geographic dif-
ferentiation contribute to product differentiation of wholesale gasoline markets in
California, Illinois and Wisconsin. Although different in approach, Pinske, Slade and
Brett (2002) assess a similar question. Pinske, Slade and Brett use a semiparamet-
ric model to identify the geographic limits of domestic wholesale gasoline markets.
While their approach does not rely on industry-specific structural assumptions, the
structure I impose on my model allows for the simulation of several counterfactuals.
2.3 Industry Overview
2.3.1 Petroleum Basics
Industry Structure
In this section, I provide background information on the petroleum industry that I
use to inform my structural model in Section 6. I first discuss the general technology
and spatial organization of the industry and then discuss how the specific industry
characteristics contribute to wholesale price volatility spikes.
Production and sale of petroleum products consists several vertically organized
steps: (i) Refining of crude oil, (ii) Transportation of refined products by pipeline or
barge to regional terminals, (iii) Storage and wholesale sale at regional terminals, (iv)
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Transportation by truck to retail stations and (v) Retail sale. The fundamental task
of refineries is to heat crude oil in the distillation tower and separate the crude oil
into different parts or "streams". The refiner then blends the streams together into
end products such as gasoline, jet fuel and diesel.4 To improve the quality or mix of
end products produced, some refiners have additional processing units which alter the
chemical properties of the petroleum streams. End products are classified into light
products, including gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene and diesel fuel, and heavier products,
which include industrial products such as fuel oil and coke. The chemical properties
of light products make them more valuable than heavier products, and thus are sold
at higher prices. Due to the relative price premium associated with light products,
the refiners maximize production of light products subject to capacity constraints
of refinery production units. Although refiners maximize light product production,
refiners trade off production between light products in response to relative prices. In
total, domestic refineries produce the vast majority of domestically-consumed light
products, accounting for approximately ninety percent of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel
consumption in 2001.5
Most domestic refineries are located near crude oil supplies in Texas, Louisiana
and California, with over fifty percent of national distillation capacity located in the
three states.6 Remaining domestic refining capacity is sited near specific end markets
(e.g. New Jersey and Illinois) or other sources of crude oil (e.g. Wyoming). As
4 End-products include everything from propane, gasoline and diesel fuel to industrial fuel oil and
residuum for road tar. These products vary along many dimensions, including boiling point, energy
content, and octane number. Depending on the use of the end-product, the product must meet
criteria along the various dimension. This, in turn, dictates which intermediate streams a refiner
can combine to create the product.
5 Although international imports vary significantly by region, even in the area with the greatest
product imports, the East Coast, imports accounted for 22, 21 and 23 percent of gasoline, jet fuel
and diesel consumption.
6 Distillation is the first step in the refining process, where the refinery heats and separates crude
oil based on boiling point. As of January 1, 2002, total domestic atmospheric distillation capacity
was 17.6 million barrels per day - 25, 16 and 12 percent of this capacity was located in Texas,
Louisiana and California respectively.
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a result of the geographic concentration of refining assets, the East Coast, upper
Midwest and occasionally the West Coast import gasoline from the Gulf Coast to
meet regional demand. To supply these markets, refiners ship petroleum products
by barge or pipeline to regional wholesale terminals located near most metropolitan
areas.
Wholesale terminals serve as a point of sale for industrial and wholesale customers
and as a short-term storage point. From the terminal, gasoline is sold to retail stations
either at the Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price or the Rack price, depending on
whether or not the terminal operator provides truck transportation from the terminal
to the retail station. Since transportation by truck is substantially more expensive
than transportation by barge or pipeline, wholesale terminals are located near most
metropolitan areas.
I focus on two crucial aspects of refinery operation which contribute to price
volatility and inform my structural model introduced in section 6. First, substantial
supply adjustment costs exist due to both specifics of refinery operation and the spa-
tial organization of the industry. Second, refiners must occasionally stop production
unexpectedly due to fires, explosions or other accidents. Slow response by unaffected
refiners to localized supply outages creates regional price volatility, which regional
content criteria exacerbate.
Refinery Operation and Price Volatility
Two aspects of domestic refining affect the speed at which refiners respond to local
shocks, (i) supply adjustment costs and (ii) transportation lags between geographic
markets. Supply adjustment costs exist since it is costly for a refinery to deviate
from a pre-planned production schedule. Supply adjustment costs arise since refiners
must contract in advance for crude oil and optimize refinery operation based on the
crude properties. Refiners contract for crude oil, several months prior to production,
based on the properties of the crude, expected demand for end-products and existing
refinery capital. The properties of the chosen crude oil and the processing units at
a particular refinery in turn define the set of end-products a particular refinery can
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produce. Just prior to production, a refiner re-optimizes refinery production based
on updated prices and the characteristics of the crude oil.
While refiners can adjust the mix of end-products they produce in the long run, by
purchasing different crude oils and changing the operation of the refinery, significant
production adjustment costs exist in the short run when the crude oil choice is fixed.
Once the production run begins, a refiner must either alter the operation of produc-
tiorn units or blend intermediate streams in a different way to achieve a different mix
of end-products. A refinery can often only increase the quantity of one high-value
end-product, such as gasoline, by blending a greater proportion of high quality inter-
mediate strearns.7 This leaves the refinery with more lower value petroleum streams
it either must blend into an end-product, reducing its quality, or sell at a low price
on the market. Thus, a refinery incurs significant costs when altering the production
mix after a production run begins. In addition, adjustment costs are greatest for end-
products meeting the highest specifications, such as gasoline. These products require
a refiner to make large changes in blending to continue to meet content requirements
for different fuels. As a result of supply adjustment costs, refiners plan production
runs several months in advance, beginning when they contract for the crude oil and
plan initial refinery operation. During the production runs, which generally last three
to six weeks, the refiner generally makes only small changes to the mix of end-products
and to the operation of particular units. Since refiners often finish production runs
prior to adjusting production mix, supply adjustment costs slow refinery response to
supply or demand shocks.8
Transportation lags also slow industry response to localized shocks. As mentioned
above, domestic refineries are relatively concentrated. Geographic concentration of
7Like refined end-products, the properties of intermediate streams from individual processing
units differ significantly. For example, straight run gasoline, extracted directly from the distillation
tower, has low octane value (70-75) and high Reid vapor pressure, while alkylate has higher oc-
tane (90-95) and lower Reid vapor pressure. In order to produce gasoline meeting RVP limits and
minimum octane content, these two streams, along with others, must be blended together.
8 See Chapter 1 and Borenstein and Shepard (2001) for a discussion of supply adjustment costs
in crude oil refining.
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refineries implies that areas with excess demand (e.g. Midwest and East Coast) must
import petroleum products from areas with excess supply (e.g. Gulf Coast).9 Figure
2.3 maps the location of large refineries as well as product movements by barge or
pipeline between areas. Even if refineries could adjust production immediately in
response to shocks, the time to transport gasoline by barge or pipeline also slows the
response of the market to a shock. It takes ten to fourteen days to pipe gasoline from
the Gulf Coast to Chicago and fourteen to twenty-two days to pipe gasoline from the
Gulf Coast to Newark. A similar three week lag exists to barge gasoline from the
Gulf Coast to California.
The presence of supply adjustment costs and transportation delays do not nec-
essarily imply a market with regional price spikes. In addition to these two factors,
a source of unexpected regional supply or demand shocks must exist and regional
inventories must be insufficient to mitigate the supply or demand shocks. Although
wholesale terminals do carry inventories, inventories held constitute only two to three
weeks of supply. In addition, although inventories exist, operational constraints of
storage limit the degree to which storage can mitigate a supply shock caused by a
large refinery outage.
2.3.2 Gasoline Content Regulations
An additional industry feature, which increases the effect of refinery outages on
domestic gasoline prices, is that gasoline is a differentiated product, due to state-
level regulation of gasoline content." In 1990, the Amendments to the Clean Air
Act initially mandated federal content criteria for gasoline in regions failing to meet
EPA limits for ozone and carbon monoxide pollution. Since mobile-source air pollu-
tion depends on both emissions and climate, the 1990 Amendments mandated three
broad regional classes of gasoline, conventional, oxygenated and reformulated gaso-
line (RFG), designing oxygenated gasoline to reduce carbon emissions and RFG to
9 Gulf Coast refineries produced roughly 57 and 16 percent of wholesale gasoline consumed in
PADD 1 (East Coast) and PADD 2 (Midwest), respectively, in 2001.
°See Chapter 1 for a summary of state and federal gasoline content regulations.
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limit ground-level ozone pollution. For each of these blends of gasoline, the federal
regulations specify standards for two general gasoline characteristics: oxygen content
and volatility. Increasing the amount of oxygen in gasoline improves the combustion
of gasoline when the weather is cold and reduces carbon monoxide emissions. De-
creasing volatility reduces the propensity of gasoline to evaporate and reduces ozone
emissions.l l The EPA requirements mandate minimum standards - subsequent to
the federal regulation, many states chose to enact supplementary regulations, either
by voluntarily adopting the federal requirements or by mandating more strict regu-
lations. 2 As a result of state-level regulation, fifteen distinct gasoline blends were
sold domestically in 2001. Figure 2.4 maps geographic boundaries of federal RFG
and oxygenated programs as well as the geographic scope of state and local content
regulations supplementing both federal programs.
California, Illinois and Wisconsin impose the most strict supplementary standards
for gasoline relative to the standards of federal RFG.1 3 Standards for California Air
Resource Board (CARB) gasoline limit the proportion of gasoline derived from par-
ticular intermediate streams and require gasoline to meet a sulfur cap. RFG sold in
Illinois and Wisconsin must meet identical volatility and oxygen content standard to
federal RFG, but Illinois and Wisconsin enacted tax incentives such that local refin-
ers meet the oxygen content requirement with ethanol. Ethanol's volatility is high
relative to other oxygenates, such as MTBE, and as a result, refiners must create a
very low volatility gasoline to blend with ethanol to meet the volatility requirement
of federal RFG. Although firms could opt to sell federal RFG in Chicago, they would
forfeit tax benefits for MTBE-RFG, as well as for other gasoline mixed with the
'Ground-level ozone increase with temperature, as evaporative emissions increase, and also in-
creases as a function of sunlight. Hence, ozone emissions rise in summer, in warm climates. Alterna-
tively, carbon emissions increase with incomplete combustion associated with starting a cold engine,
and are more of a problem in cold climates during the winter.
12Opt-in to the federal RFG program accounts for approximately one-third of RFG consumption.
13Although the focus of this paper, Illinois, Wisconsin and California are not alone in mandating
special blends of gasoline. Currently, 15 different blends of gasoline exist across the country. For an
in-depth discussion of "boutique fuels" and the potential effects, Chapter 1.
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MTBE-RFG at the wholesale terminal. As a result, gasoline meeting federal RFG
requirements is not sold in areas requiring CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG.
It is also important to note that not only does federal RFG fail to meet the content
specifications of these two blends of gasoline, but CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended
RFG are mutually incompatible.
In this paper, I focus specifically on the effects of CARB and ethanol-blended
RFG since, unlike oxygenated gasoline, these blends require refinery-level production
adjustments to meet content specification. These are in contrast to oxygenated gaso-
line, which only requires refiners to supplement the oxygen content of conventional
gasoline. Increasing production of either CARB gasoline or Ethanol-blended RFG re-
quires a refinery to alter the blending of intermediate streams and potentially entails
supplementary processing (eg. the removal of sulfur for CARB gasoline). Thus, these
fuels are the ones most likely to entail substantial supply adjustment costs, and the
ones most likely to be affected by unexpected supply shocks.
Other Structural Changes
Complicating an analysis of price spikes are structural changes in the industry concur-
rent with changing content regulations. Substantial industry consolidation occurred
during the late 1990's.l4 Although required asset divestitures limited increases in
refinery concentration, changes in ownership still may affect competition between re-
fineries. In addition to industry consolidation, there has also been a trend toward
decreasing reserve refining capacity over the past twenty years. In 1981, annual refin-
ery production was 68 percent of refinery capacity.1 5 Due to closure of old refineries,
increasing demand and only incremental changes to refining capacity at existing sites
over the past twenty years, current utilization of refining capacity exceeds 95 percent.
As a result, unexpected refinery outages could increase local wholesale prices simply
14Large horizontal mergers in the petroleum industry include British Petroleum and Amoco in
1998, Exxon and Mobil in 1999 and BP/Amoco and Arco in 2000.
5 See Dazzo, N., Lidderdale, T., and N. Masterson, "U.S. Refining Capacity Utilization," Energy
Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Monthly
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by virtue of little spare production capacity existing in the current industry.
2.3.3 Regional Price Volatility and Refinery Outages
This paper examines the extent to which content regulations in Illinois, Wisconsin and
California contribute to gasoline price volatility resulting from unexpected refinery
outages. 6 For purposes of the analysis, these supply shocks have two important
properties. First, fires and explosions at refineries are unpredictable events. Second,
these events are localized supply shocks, and, in many cases, necessitate maintenance
of a significant portion of the local refining capacity. An example of such an event
is the fire that damaged the Lemont, IL distillation unit on August 14, 2001, closing
the refinery for six weeks and reducing production for several months thereafter.
While not the largest refinery in Illinois, Lemont accounts for 16 percent of Illinois'
distillation capacity. Refinery outages are significantly larger than other types of
local shocks in markets, and importantly, are often large relative to local wholesale
inventories.
The geographic nature of refining and transportation, local content regulation and
supply adjustment costs have the potential to contribute to regional price volatility.
In the event of an outage of a plant producing either ethanol-blended reformulated
gasoline or California Air Resources Board gasoline, such as the Lemont refinery,
incompatible standards prevent nearby refiners producing other gasoline blends from
selling them in these areas. In addition to transportation lags and supply adjustment
costs, which slow the speed at which refineries respond to shocks, incompatible content
regulations might additionally constrain refinery response to supply shocks. Thus,
these regulations have the potential to compound the effects of an unexpected refinery
outage, especially in the case of gasoline formulations with no substitutes such as
ethanol-blended RFG or CARB gasoline.
16Pipeline outages, which are not explicitly modelled in this paper, can act in a similar manner
to supply shocks. As an example, a pipeline outage contributed to high gasoline prices in Phoenix,
AZ in September 2003.
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2.4 Data
I collect two sets of data with which I estimate reduced-form and structural models: (i)
market-level prices and quantities, and (ii) refinery-level data influencing production
decisions, such as oil prices, transportation costs and refinery outages.
The price and quantity data, from the Energy Information Administration (EIA)
Petroleum Marketing Monthly, consist of monthly observations of wholesale price and
quantity for the three major light petroleum products, gasoline, No.2 distillate (home
heating oil and diesel fuel) and jet fuel. I use seven years of observations, beginning
Jan 1995 and ending with Dec 2001, after the Midwest and California price spikes of
2000 and 2001. For gasoline, the EIA separately tracks prices and volumes monthly
by state and federal formulation standard. 17 An example observation would be the
wholesale price and quantity of federal RFG sold in Massachusetts in August 2000.
Since wholesale gasoline prices vary depending on whether or not the wholesaler pro-
vides transportation to the retail station, in both the reduced-form regressions and
the structural model, I use average monthly "rack" price net of taxes for each state-
formulation combination. The "rack" price is the wholesale price paid at the terminal
and does not include any transportation costs from the terminal to the individual sta-
tions.' 8 For diesel and jet fuel, I use regional average monthly prices net of taxes of
product sold for resale in each of eight petroleum area defense districts PADDs.19
Volumes for all products are prime supplier volumes defined as sales by wholesale
marketers to retailers. This classification represents the closest analogy to wholesale
volumes. To verify that prime supplier volumes are representative of wholesale gaso-
7Ideally, the relevant market for wholesale gasoline would be at the terminal-formulation level.
While state-level data does not bias the estimate of persistent effects of content regulation, it would
lead to a conservative estimate of the effect of content regulation on price spikes if within-state
transportation costs are sufficient to limit arbitrage between terminals within the same state, i the
event on a local refinery outage and spike within a particular area.
18A shortcoming of the EIA data is that it does not differentiate between branded rack sales (eg.
sales of Chevron gasoline) and unbranded rack sales.
9 Roughly corresponding to the Northeast (la), Mid-atlantic (lb), South-east (c), Midwest (2),
Gulf Coast (3), Rocky Mountains (4) and West Coast (5).
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line volumes, I compare the EIA prime supplier gasoline volumes to state-reported
monthly wholesale gasoline sales reported to the Federal Highway Administration. 20
The EIA Petroleum Marketing Monthly only tracks gasoline sales by federal-
formulation standard, and does not specifically track regional blends exceeding federal
requirements. Although sales of CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended reformulated
gasoline are not identified in the EIA data, both gasoline blends meet federal-RFG
standards and are reported as such in the dataset. In addition, no other gasoline
blends in California, Illinois and Wisconsin meet federal RFG standards. Thus, I
attribute all reported RFG sales in these states as either a sale of CARB gasoline or
ethanol-blended RFG depending on the state. For the structural model, I aggregate
conventional and oxygenated gasoline, since oxygenated gasoline is only differentiated
from conventional gasoline by the addition of oxygenate at the refinery or terminal
and does not require incremental refinery-level processing. Therefore, the structural
model focuses on six light petroleum products, four of which are distinct blends of
gasoline: (i) conventional gasoline, (ii) federal-mandate reformulated gasoline, (iii)
ethanol-blended RFG, (iv) CARB gasoline, (v) jet fuel or kerosene, and (vi) diesel
fuel or number two distillate fuel. As a result, my panel of market-level data consists
of 84 monthly observations for each of 62 markets for gasoline, defined by state and
federal formulation standards, eight regional markets for jet fuel and eight regional
markets for diesel fuel.21
To simulate refinery production, I construct several refinery-specific variables cov-
ering (i) ownership and capacity of refineries, (ii) crude oil and transportation costs,
2 0 Although FHA data only report wholesale gasoline sales aggregated across federal formulation
standards, I similarly aggregated EIA data for purposes of comparison. Aside from several instances
of reporting or recording error in the FHA data, same-state same-month observations from the EIA
data and the FHA data were, on average, within three percent of each other.
21Sixty two gasoline markets are the result of some states having multiple formulations over the
study period. For example, outside of the Milwaukee area, Wisconsin stations sell conventional
gasoline. From January 1, 1995 until December 31, 1995, Milwaukee stations sold federal RFG
while from January 1, 1996 on, Milwaukee stations sold ethanol-oxygenated RFG. For purposes of
this paper, each of these is treated as a separate market for gasoline.
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(iii) refinery outage information, and (iv) petroleum product imports. I construct
a comprehensive dataset of refinery ownership, closures and capacity over the study
period from the EIA Petroleum Supply Annual and annual surveys conducted by
the EIA of petroleum capacity at domestic refineries. While the annual surveys in-
clude the capacity of various production units at refineries, they do not explicitly
dlefine production capacity of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel at these refineries. I use
a function of distillation and cracking capacity to calculate the production limit of
light products at these refineries, based on crude oil assays which specify the mix of
light products derivable from West Texas Intermediate at a simple (distillation only)
refinery.22 Of the 173 domestic refineries operating at some point during the study
period, I consider the subset of 117 refineries located in the contiguous US with light
product production capacity exceeding eight hundred thousand gallons per day. This
subset of refiners contains over ninety-five percent of estimated domestic light product
capacity. 2 3
Crude oil costs for refineries are monthly average purchase prices of crude oil
tracked by the EIA, adjusted for transportation. For refineries located in the Midwest
or East Coast, I use the spot price of West Texas Intermediate at Cushing, OK,
adjusted for pipeline transportation costs from Cushing to the refinery location. For
refineries in Wyoming, Montana and Utah, I use a crude spot price for Wyoming Sour,
and for refineries on the West Coast, I use an average spot price for Alaskan North
Shore crude and California Offshore crude, all of which I adjust for transportation
costs. 24
22 Specifically, my calculation of light-product production capacity at these refineries is equal to
forty percent of atmospheric distillation capacity added to the sum of thermal cracking capacity,
catalytic cracking capacity and hydrocracking capacity. Although this is a rough measure of capacity,
as crude choice affects production limits, individuals knowledgeable about refining consider this a
reasonable approximation of light product capacity.
2 3Many smaller refineries produce specialized petroleum products for industrial use and do not
actively produce gasoline, jet fuel and distillate. As a result, although these refineries account for
approximately five percent of light-product capacity, they account for a smaller proportion of light
product production.
2 4 Although different spot prices are used, crude spot prices in California, Alaska and Wyoming
74
Transportation costs for petroleum products by pipelines, barges and trucks are
estimates presented before the Federal Trade Commission of 2, 4.5 and 30 cents
per gallon per thousand miles of transportation. 25 I identify each refinery's ability
to serve each of the 78 markets described above using several sources. Maps of
refineries and petroleum product pipelines determine pipeline access of each refinery.
In addition, since pipelines are unidirectional, I use these maps to determine the
markets each refinery is able to serve by pipeline. Access to barge transportation is
determined either by proximity to water or access to pipelines serving water-proximate
storage terminals. Transportation costs for each refinery-state combination are then
calculated as the least cost method of serving the state from the refinery. For example,
a refinery in Texas with access to barges is assumed to serve Nevada markets by
barging product from Texas to California and then shipping that product by pipeline
from California to Nevada. While I do not explicitly model pipeline constraints in
this paper, omitting pipeline constraints would lead to a conservative estimate of the
effect of content regulation on price volatility.
Imports of petroleum products are small relative to domestic production - hence,
in the structural model, I take imports to be exogenous.2 6 The EIA tracks monthly
imports by petroleum district of a variety of finished petroleum products, including
gasoline by federal-formulation standard. Conventional gasoline imports are assumed
to be the sum of oxygenated imports and other gasoline imports. Jet fuel imports are
assumed to be sum of jet fuel and aviation gasoline imports. Reformulated gasoline
and distillate fuel oil are taken as reported. Since the imports of motor gasoline
are reported by PADD and not by state, I proportionately distribute imports to
states within each PADD based on same-month consumption of either conventional
or reformulated gasoline.
The supply shocks I exploit are unexpected refinery outages due to fires, explo-
closely correlate with the WTI spot price at Cushing, OK.
2 5See Colonial Pipeline presentation to the FTC. These values are consistent with estimates of
transportation costs from the EIA's 2003 California Gasoline Price Study.
2 6Imports of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel fuel were 10, 10 and 9 percent of domestic consumption
in 2001.
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sions, lightning or other unexpected events at refineries. I identify unexpected outages
by searching news, government and industry sources reporting events in the petroleum
refining industry. Sources for information on outages include regional and national
newspapers, SEC filings made by publicly-traded refiners, and incident reports by
the US Chemical Safety Board, EPA and OSHA. I identify a total of 121 incidents,
forty-five of which necessitated the shutdown of one or more processing units at the
117 refineries in my subsample from January 1995 to December 2001. For each of
these incidents, I identify the processing unit or units involved, the duration of the
outage, and estimate the effect of the outage on light-product production. Table 2.1
lists the unexpected outages I identify through news, regulatory and industry sources,
along with the outage date, repair date and outage severity.
2.5 Reduced-Form Regression
2.5.1 Data and Estimation
I initially use a reduced-form model to estimate the effect of gasoline content regu-
lations on wholesale price levels. The general specification for the panel regression I
use is given by
Pijt = f (Qijt, Wijt, Regijt)
Qijt = g(Pijt, Zijt)
where i denotes state, j denotes blend, t denotes time, Pijt is the real rack price of
gasoline, Qijt is the volume of gasoline sold for resale, Wijt is a vector of production
input costs, Regijt is a vector of content regulation variables and Zijt is a vector of
income and other demographic variables. To consistently estimate the coefficients
of the first equation, I use the vector of demand factors exogenous to price, Zijt, to
instrument for quantity in the first equation. Table 2.2 lists descriptive statistics for
the variables used in the reduced-form model. This approach implicitly treats content
regulation as exogenous to price. Regulation is exogenous to price for areas required
to adopt either RFG or oxygenated gasoline due to non-compliance with Clean Air
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Act standards. For areas opting into the federal programs, if a state decision is
endogenous to gasoline price, states for which content regulations are more costly
would be less likely to opt-in. Thus, treating regulation as purely exogenous provides
a conservative estimate of the mean price effect.
In order to estimate coefficients for content regulation, consider the fixed-effects
panel regression corrected for AR(1) errors
Pijt = O + /3oQizt + / 1WTIt + yRegijt + vi + ijt
ijt ijt + Peijt-i
ijtN(O, ia)
where ui denote state fixed-effects, QZt instrumented quantity, WTIijt West Texas
Intermediate crude oil spot price delivered to Cushing, OK, instrumented by the Brent
North Sea crude spot price, and Regijt content regulation dummy variables identifying
blends meeting oxygenated gasoline, RFG, ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline
requirements.2 7 In subsequent specifications, I also include month-year fixed effects
and month-region fixed effects. In each of these specifications, states entering and
leaving the programs and states with more than one specification of gasoline identify
of the effect of regional content regulations. Table 2.3 presents the coefficients and
standard errors for three model specifications. Errors are assumed to follow an AR(1)
process within state-blend panels with a common autocorrelation coefficient p, and
are heteroscedastic across state-blend pairs.
I also run fixed-effects regressions for several alternative specifications. Specifi-
cation 2 uses WTI crude spot price with a vector of month-year fixed effects, and
specification 3 allows for month fixed effects which vary by PADD. The second speci-
fication allows for a more flexible common time-trend than the specification including
WTI crude spot price. The third specification allows for different monthly trends for
each region. In each regression, ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline dummy
27A Hausman specification test of the random effects model indicates that E[e, VI] : 0, necessitating
the use of a fixed-effects specification.
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variables are additive with respect to the RFG dummy. Thus, the coefficients for ei-
ther the ethanol-blended RFG or CARB dummies represent the effect on price levels
from more strict regulation, relative to federal reformulated gasoline.
Looking at the first specification, the coefficients on content regulation dummies
are positive and sign-consistent with ex-ante predictions of increased production costs
of CARB gasoline, RFG and oxygenated gasoline relative to conventional gasoline.
The coefficients of the content regulations dummies are statistically significant at the
one percent level. Relative to conventional gasoline over 1995 to 2001, oxygenated
gasoline and reformulated gasoline rack prices are 3.5 and 3.8 cents per gallon higher
than conventional gasoline. In addition, ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline
rack prices are 1.8 and 3.2 cents per gallon higher than federal RFG, although each
point estimate is imprecisely estimated.2 8 Allowing for state-specific monthly trends
in specification 3, the estimated price effect of the regulations are 4.9 cpg and 4.2
cpg for oxygenated gasoline and federal RFG relative to conventional gasoline, and
1.7 cpg and 5.1 cpg for ethanol-blended RFG and GARB gasoline relative to federal
RFG. These estimates are consistent both with EPA estimates of the incremental cost
of federal RFG over conventional gasoline of four to eight cents per gallon, historical
Chicago/Dallas RFG price differentials of six to eleven cents per gallon, and California
Air Resource Board estimates of incremental costs of GARB gasoline standards of five
to fifteen cents per gallon.29
2.5.2 Structural Model Justification
The reduced-form model provides a consistent estimate of the effect on wholesale
price levels of federal and regional gasoline content regulations. In order to iden-
28 It is important to note that oxygenated and reformulated gasoline also have lower energy content
than conventional gasoline due to the addition of oxygenates. These blends reduce mileage per gallon
in cars by 2-3 and 1-2 percent respectively. This effect is not incorporated into these regression, but
would increase the price level effect of these regulations.
2 9See Testimony of R. Perciasepe and Testimony of C. Browner before US House of Representa-
tives, Commerce Committee, July 2000 (http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/) and Bulow
et al. at page 146
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tify the effect of content regulations on regional price spikes, though, I formulate a
structural model of refinery production decisions. The structural model allows me to
simulate counterfactuals in which California, Illinois and Wisconsin mandate gaso-
line blends meeting only federal RFG requirements. Such a counterfactual is difficult
to formulate in the reduced-form model. A counterfactual in which California gaso-
line meeting only federal-RFG standards must control for transportation costs from
other sources of federal-RFG. If transportation costs are sufficiently high, compatibil-
ity with federal-RFG standard may not mitigate the effect of an unexpected refinery
outage. A structural model allows me to control for this, by simulating the production
decisions of refiners which incorporate transportation costs and changes in refinery
ownership.
2.6 Structural Model of Supply Shocks
To simulate an accurate counterfactual, I specify a structural model based on the
production optimization problem of refineries, which allows me to identify the effect of
incompatible regulations coming from production costs, changes in competition due to
incremental production costs and changes in the response of refineries to unexpected
outages.
I consider a three step game in which refiners choose quantities of light petroleum
products to maximize an objective function subject to changing information about
refinery outages. Consistent with refinery planning prior to production runs, refineries
make production decisions in the first step without knowing outages. Outages are then
realized and observed by refineries. Finally, since refineries can reallocate production,
but supply adjustment costs exist, refineries re-optimize production in the final step
in response to the outage, under the constraint that the product mix chosen in the
first step is unchanged. Thus, a refinery choosing to produce federal RFG, but not
CARB gasoline, can redistribute federal RFG from one market to another in response
to an outage, but cannot, in the short term, produce CARB gasoline instead.
In the first step, I assume that refineries have knowledge of all supply and de-
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mand variables with the exception of unexpected outages occurring in the current
period. That is, prior to choosing initial production at time t, refineries know the
inverse residual demand curve accounting for imports, Pjt(.), in each geographic and
product market j E {1, 2,. . , J} in addition to input costs for all refineries. For
each domestic refinery, i {1, 2,. .. , I}, let qijt be the initial choice of quantity in
market j at time t, it denote the total production capacity of all light petroleum
products, c(qil, qi2,... ,qiJ) be the refinery production cost function and tij denote
the transportation costs from refinery i to market j.
In the second step, refinery outages and severity are realized and fully observed
by all refineries.
In the third step, refiners re-optimize their production decisions in response to
the realization of outages C Q. Refineries are allowed redistribute their production
from step 1 across geographic markets, but not across petroleum products. Thus, I
denote {J 1, J2, .. ., Jr} a proper partition of markets {1, 2, .. , J}, where all markets
sharing a given set of content regulations belong to one element of {J1, J2, . . ,n.3
Given a partition of the markets based on product characteristics, in the third step, a
refiner owning a set of refineries I C { 1, 2,. . , I} chooses a vector of Nash quantities
{qijt} for i CE I to maximize an objective function consisting of own-refinery profits
plus a portion of non-own refinery profits, captured by the coefficient of competition,
."31 That is, the objective function of a particular refiner is given by
U E Hit + a Hilt
iE! i'~I
where Hit is given by
3 0For example, J1 could denote conventional gasoline markets, J2 reformulated gasoline markets,
J3 jet fuel markets, and J 4 CARB gasoline.
31 See Cyert and DeGroot (1973). In this formulation, the interpretation of a is the weight an
individual refiner places on the profits of refineries it does not own. A value of a- = 1 is consistent
with joint profit maximization by all refiners while a value of a = 0 implies entirely own-profit
maximization.
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Hilt = E ijt(Pj()) - > ijttij - C(Qilt, i2t,', * Jjit)-
j j
subject to non-negativity constraints and binding product-level capacity constraints
ij > 0 forall j J
E ij = E qij
jEJ1 jEJ1
X, qij = E qij
jEJ2 jCJ2
qij = , qij
jEJn jEJn
Note that in this specification, a value of a = 1 implies joint profit maximization
by all refineries and a = 0 implies a single-period game in quantities. For refineries
affected by an outage at time t and with initial production exceeding post-outage
refinery capacity, production is scaled back evenly across all products.
Prior to the realization of outages, the refinery chooses a binding production mix,
which it is then able to allocate in response to outages. Once the refinery commits to a
production mix in the first step of the optimization, it is constrained to that mix after
the realization of outages, consistent with substantial industry supply adjustment
costs within, but not between, production runs. Thus, in the first step, refiners
choose pre-planned production quantities of each petroleum product to maximize the
expectation, with respect to all possible refinery outages w C Q, of own-refinery profits
plus a portion of other refinery profits, . The objective function for a refiner owning
refineries I C {1, 2,. .,I} is given by
U = E(- HFit) + cE(> 1Hi't),
ieI i'¢i
subject to refinery capacity and non-negativity constraints
qil qi2 + +qiJ _< qi
qij > 0
for all i C I and all j where Hlit is again
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nit -jt(Pj()) qijttij - C(ilt, 2t, ,qiJt)'
J i
In the first step, the expectation is taken with respect to the continuous state space
of all possible refinery outages. In order to numerically solve for the equilibrium, I
initially assume refiners place a zero prior probability on unexpected refinery outages.
Treating the optimization in this way induces refineries to produce less CARB
and ethanol-blended RFG than they otherwise would if they assumed an outage at a
plant in California or Illinois were likely. As part of my sensitivity analyses, I verify
the robustness of my simulations to this assumption by allowing for refineries to place
a positive prior probability on a discrete subspace of the continuum of all possible
refinery outages. I find that this assumption does not change my conclusions. Al-
though outages have a large local effect, the probability of an outage is low.32 When
choosing production, refiners weigh the benefits of additional CARB or ethanol-RFG
production in states of the world in which a local outage occurs in California, Illinois
or Wisconsin, against the incremental production costs associated with manufactur-
ing CARB or ethanol-RFG as well as the shadow-cost of capacity if the refinery is
capacity constrained. As a result, assuming refiners place a zero probability prior on
unexpected outages does not change refinery choice of production significantly. When
simulated, the magnitude of the effect is over an order of magnitude less than the
effect of the content regulations.
Given the specification of the game above and suppressing the time subscript,
initial choice of production for market j by refinery i satisfies the first order condition
qij i+ qkj 0 P +pj - - i Ai + Iiij 0i~~qij Oqij Oqij ~~~~~Oqijk~I/i +7ki~q. 9
where Ai denotes the shadow cost of production capacity at refinery i and gij denotes
the non-negativity constraint. In the event of an refinery outage, the final choice of
3 2Recall that over the seven year period, news, industry and government sources document only
forty-five production-lowering outages. Over the seven year period, the expected monthly percentage
of total refinery capacity down due to an unexpected outage is 0.2 percent.
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production satisfies
OPj Op3 Op j Oci
+ qkj ' +P +A iij = 0,Z3 O/ij qij q - qi3p Oqij
where ij denotes the shadow cost of the production constraint of refinery i to in-
crease production of a petroleum product compatible with product j. Alternatively,
expressing the FOC as a lerner-style index, the quantities of all I refineries must
jointly satisfy the set of I first order conditions for market j, given by
pj-tij - O` + Ai + tij 1 1 Oqzj + E +a 
~-±
PJ cij kEI/i Ckj k¢i 6 kj
where cij denotes elasticity of the residual demand curve faced by refinery i in market
j at quantity qj.
To complete the model, I make functional form assumptions for the cost and de-
mand functions, c(qil , q 2 , ... , qij) and Pjt(.). Let the refinery production cost function
be additively separable and let the marginal cost of refinery i to produce a fuel for
market j at time t be
MCijt = /3 + 1 * OilPriceit + 02 * Log(DCit) +
33 * RFG + 4 * ERFG +/35 * CARB +6 * JF +37 *DIST3
where OilPriceit is the delivered oil price at refinery i, Log(DCit) is the log of at-
mospheric distillation capacity of refinery i, and RFGj, ERFGj ,CARBj, JF and
DISTj are dummy variables corresponding to reformulated gasoline, ethanol-blended
RFG, CARB gasoline, jet fuel and distillate.3 3 This choice of functional form for the
cost function captures both the differential production costs for various products, as
well as economies of scale in refinery production, as the coefficient on the log of dis-
tillation capacity. Moreover, it allows for region-specific crude prices, incorporating
both the price of local crude streams and transportation to the refinery.
3 3 Although other products exist, including residuum, residual oil and other light products, gaso-
line, distillate and jet fuel constitute the vast majority of light products produced at refineries. In
addition, the properties of each are similar enough that similar intermediate streams are used for
each.
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I take Pjt(.), the inverse demand function for market j at time t, to be linear given
by the functional form
Pit(qjt) = P+t + ( - )(qj-q)
Eqft
where p and q are the observed price and quantity in market j at time t. This
specification is equivalent to a first-order taylor approximation of a isoelastic demand
curve, jt(pjt) = _pjt, taken at the observed price and quantity in market j at time t.
2.7 Structural Estimation
2.7.1 Assumptions and Estimation
Absent the functional form specifications for the cost and demand functions, the
three-step model in the previous section defines a deterministic correspondence, which
I denote f: (X, 0) - Y, between factors influencing refinery supply decisions, such as
content regulations, input and transportation costs collectively denoted (X), and the
vector of unobserved parameters (0), which includes unobserved cost, conduct and
elasticity parameters, and market-level prices and quantities (Y).34 That is, f maps
a given state space and values for unobservable parameters to all market equilibria
that are solutions to the refinery optimization problem. Given the linear functional
forms assumed for supply and demand, the set of FOCs for the model simplifies to a
full-rank linear problem. Thus, the functional form assumptions provide a sufficient
condition for f to be a function, implying a unique solution to the optimization
problem.
Since the model contains unobservable parameters for refinery conduct and pro-
duction cost, prior to simulating the effect of the content regulations, I first estimate
the vector of unobservable cost, conduct and elasticity parameters, 0. In order to
estimate the unobserved parameters, I introduce a stochastic error term into the de-
mand curve of each market, that is common to all refiners, and realized after refiners
3 4 The set of unobservables, denoted 0, consists of the eight cost parameters {/3 ,13 2,... ,38 ) , the
conduct parameter and demand elasticity parameter e.
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choose quantities in each market. I take 6jt N(0, a2) to be an additive stochastic
shock to the inverse demand curve for market j from the previous section,
A
pjt(q) = P4t + (P A )(qjt -A) + 6jt.
I assume that jt is independent and identically distributed across geographic areas.
Intuitively, this source of error is akin to a common market shock to a population's
propensity to drive, unobservable to refiners. For example, unexpectedly good or
poor weather might constitute a shock to demand, common yet unpredictable to all
refiners serving a particular market. Linearity of the refiner FOC's implies a structural
functional form given by the non-linear regression
Yit f(Xt, 0) + jt, j 6 t - N(0, a2)
Due to the three-step nature of the model, the associated likelihood function cannot
be expressed as a closed function of the vector of unobserved parameters.
Thus, I numerically search for the NLLS set of parameters, that is, = argmino((f(X, 0)-
Y)'(f(X, 0)-Y)). I estimate 0 numerically, finding the vector of values for 0 minimiz-
ing the squared error between f(X, 0) and Y via a steepest ascent search algorithm.35
As part of my robustness checks, I test the sensitivity of my simulation results to
variations in the NLLS parameter point estimates.
2.7.2 Estimated Parameters and Interpretation
Table 2.4 lists the NLLS estimates for 0. The point estimates are generally consistent
with expectations. The coefficient on log distillation capacity, 31, is less than 0
and consistent with increasing returns to distillation capacity. The coefficient on
crude cost, /32 is below the ex ante prediction of 1. This suggests that the spot
351n this case, the steepest ascent search algorithm is computationally efficient relative to a method
requiring computation of the second derivatives, such as Gauss-Newton. The seed point for the
steepest ascent algorithm, = .15,3o = 5,,31 = 1,/32 = -1,3 = 5,/4 = 8,5 = 10,36 = -2,,37 =
-4, is based on an initial simulation of PADD 5 only and ex-ante government estimates for production
costs of different gasoline blends.
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price overstates the price of crude oil processed at refineries, possibly due to long
term contracts whose prices vary less than domestic spot prices. Cost parameters
corresponding to differential production costs for different product blends are similar
to government and industry estimates. The incremental production costs for federal
RFG and CARB gasoline are within EPA and CARB estimates of four to eight cents
and five to fifteen cents respectively.
The competition coefficient and elasticity estimates are similar to expectations
as well. Although it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of
competition is 0, the estimated value of a is 0.03, consistent with almost complete
own-profit maximization by refiners. Repeated interaction could enable tacit collusion
amongst refiners - in such a world, tacit collusion would reduce production below the
levels which maximize own-refiner profit in the static game. In other words, refiners
place positive weight on the profits of other refiners. The small point estimate for a
suggests persistent tacit collusion is not prevalent, consistent with the conclusions of
academic and non-academic studies.36
The estimate of short-run gasoline demand elasticity is consistent with both the
meta-analysis presented in Espey(1998) and recent estimates in Considine (2001).
Espey finds the mean and median of 363 estimates of short run gasoline demand to
be -0.26 and -0.23, respectively. My estimate of the short run elasticity, -0.337, is
slightly more elastic than the median and mean of the sample collected in Espey,
but is well within the range of sample estimates of 0 to -1.36.37 In addition to other
robustness checks, I verify my conclusions are unchanged by using a demand elasticity
of -0.23.
36See, in particular, Bulow et al. (2003) and FTC Midwest Price Spike Investigation (2001). This
approach, though, cannot rule out infrequent collusion by refiners.
37 As part of my robustness checks, I perform specific sensitivity tests to verify that my simulations
estimates are robust to the assumption of more inelastic demand.
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2.7.3 Model Fit
As important as reasonable estimates of the parameters is the degree to which the
structural model accurately simulates prices across the different product and geo-
graphic markets. It is also important that the model predict price spikes resulting
from unexpected refinery outages. I use two metrics to measure the fit of the simu-
lated and actual prices. By product and geographic market, I compare the first and
second moments of the simulated and actual prices, to assess whether, in aggregate,
the simulation accurately models factors which lead to differences in wholesale prices
across products and geographic markets. Table 2.5 and 2.6 list descriptive statis-
tics for actual and estimated prices across different petroleum products and different
PADD regions. For comparison, I include the estimated price from both the struc-
tural model and the reduced-form model. The reduced-form and structural models
draw from identical samples, with the exception that the reduced-form model does
not estimate prices for jet fuel and diesel.
Both the mean and standard deviations for the simulated wholesale prices are
similar across blends and regions to mean and standard deviations of actual prices.
Across geographic regions, all estimates from the structural and reduced-form models
are within four percent of the actual means. The structural model overpredicts mean
product price in PADD 3 (Gulf Coast) and PADD la (New England) by 2.8 cpg and
1.6 cpg, and underpredicts prices in PADD 4 (Rocky Mountains) and PADD lb (Mid-
Atlantic) by 1.5 and 1.2 cpg. Mean estimates for the PADD 2 (Midwest) and PADD
5 (West Coast) are within 0.5 cpg of the actual means. Mean prices, by formulation,
estimated by the structural and reduced-form models are near actual estimates as
well. The largest over- or under-estimation of mean price is that of CARB gasoline,
overestimated by six percent.
Maximum simulated prices are lower than the maximum actual wholesale prices
from 1995 through 2001. The largest deviation exists for ethanol-blended REG where
the difference between estimated and actual maximum prices is 30 and 27 cpg for
the structural and reduced-form models, respectively. The underestimation is the
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result of the simulation not fully predicting the Spring 2000 price spike for ethanol-
blended RFG. While several refinery outages occurred in Spring 2000, these do not
sufficiently explain the large change in the price ethanol-blended RFG.38 During this
period , ethanol-blended RFG was first required to meet more strict federal Phase II
guidelines. Initially, refiners had difficult meeting Phase II emission guidelines while
continuing to use ethanol as an oxygenate. This transition contributed to high prices
of ethanol-blended RFG in Spring 2000, and as an initial but not persistent difficulty
with producing ethanol-blended RFG is not accounted for by the simulation model.
Hence, simulated prices are substantially below actual prices for ethanol-blended RFG
during May 2000.
To assess the degree to which the model accurately captures the effect of outages,
I first-difference the simulated and actual wholesale prices in months with unexpected
local outages. Although the model does not predict the Spring 2000 price spike in
the Midwest, the model does predict wholesale price responses to local outages well.
The simulated mean change in wholesale ethanol-blended RFG prices in months with
a local unexpected outage is 9.91 and 9.90 cents per gallon in Illinois and Wisconsin,
which is close to the actual mean change of 10.08 and 9.71 cents per gallon respec-
tively. For CARB gasoline, simulated mean change in wholesale prices in months
with unexpected outages of California refineries is 5.91 cents per gallon, relative to
an actual mean change of 6.65 cents per gallon.
2.8 Simulation Results
Using the NLLS estimates of the cost, conduct and elasticity parameters, I simulate
wholesale prices under several counterfactuals to estimate the degree to which content
regulations, industry consolidation and declining reserve capacity affect price levels
and price spikes. I also test the sensitivity of the simulation results to variations in
the NLLS estimated parameters and modelling assumptions.
38 Contributing factors to the Spring 2000 price spike are qualitatively discussed in Bulow et al
(2003) and FTC (2001).
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2.8.1 Effects of Gasoline Content Regulation
I estimate the effect of CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG on regional price lev-
els and the extent to these local content regulations contribute to price spikes caused
by refinery outages. To quantify the effect of these regulations, I simulate counter-
factual prices for each of my 78 markets as if the content regulations in California,
Illinois and Wisconsin simply met federal RFG standards. For the counterfactual, I
keep all outages, changes in ownership, capacity additions, and input costs identical
to those in the base case. Thus, the only difference between the base case and initial
counterfactuals is the change in gasoline content regulation in the three states.
Treating gasoline standards in California, Illinois and Wisconsin as compatible
with federal RFG standards has three effects. First, production costs for federal RFG
are lower than those for either CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG. A second
related effect is that if production costs change, refineries make different production
choices under non-outage conditions. Finally, in the event of a local refinery out-
ages, regional standards prevent reallocation of output across geographic markets,
which would occur but for incompatible content regulations. NLLS estimates for
cost parameters identify the first effect, the incremental production costs associated
with CARB or ethanol-blended RFG. I distinguish the second and third effects by
identifying months in which unexpected local refinery outages occurred in California,
Illinois and Wisconsin. For months without outages, the first two effects alter prices
while for months with unexpected outages, all three have an effect on the market
price.3 9 Thus, the average price differential between the base case and counterfactual
in months without local outages identify the persistent effects of additional production
costs. The difference in the average price differential in months with local outages and
months without outages identify the effect of incompatible content regulations. For
outages exceeding a month in duration, I only consider the first month of the outage,
since refiners subsequently adjust production mix after the first month to account for
the outage.
3 9Note this makes an implicit assumption, supported both by the simulation results and actual
data, that local refinery produce the vast majority of CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG.
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I calculate the average differential between the simulated price in the base case,
with existing content regulations in CA, IL and WI, and the simulated price in the
counterfactual, where regulations in CA, IL and WI are compatible with federal-
RFG. In particular, I calculate the average differential conditional on whether or not
an unexpected local outage occurred, as well as unconditional on outage. I list the
average price differentials in Table 2.10. The differential in months without outages
(column 3 in Table 2.10) identifies the persistent effect of increased production costs.
The average price differential in months with local outages (column 1) identifies the
effects of both increased production costs and content regulations incompatible with
federal RFG criteria.
The point estimates of price effects of additional production costs associated with
content regulations in California, Chicago and Milwaukee are 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents per
gallon. That is, conditional on outage-free operation of all domestic refineries, average
wholesale price in California, Chicago and Milwaukee would be 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents
per gallon lower if areas required federal RFG instead of CARB and ethanol-blended
RFG respectively. Conditional on a local outage in California, Illinois and Wisconsin,
content regulations inconsistent with federal RFG standards raise wholesale gasoline
prices in California, Chicago and Milwaukee 9.3, 9.6 and 9.9 cents on average.4 0
Since months with local outages provide a point estimate of the combined effect of
increased production costs and incompatible regulations, removing the portion of the
price changes attributable to additional production costs provides an estimate of the
portion of the price spikes attributable solely to incompatible fuel regulations. Taking
the difference between the differential contingent on a local outage and the differential
contingent on outage-free operation (ie. the difference between Column 1 and Column
3 in Table 2.10), I find that incompatible content regulations raise prices 4.8, 6.6 and
7.0 cents per gallon in California, Illinois and Wisconsin.
Since actual refinery outages vary in severity and duration, the larger effect of fuel
4 0 Substantial variation exists across specific local outages - in months with the largest outages in
California, Illinois and Wisconsin, simulated prices with local content regulations are 20 cents per
gallon higher than simulated prices in the counterfactual.
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incompatibility in Chicago and Milwaukee could be simply a result of the magnitude
of local refinery outages experienced in Illinois and Wisconsin. That is, if refinery
outages in Illinois and Wisconsin were of greater magnitude or of longer duration
than outages in California, the effect of content regulations would appear greater
due entirely to differences in local outages. As a way to control for the severity and
duration of local shocks, I simulate market prices under another counterfactual, in
which local content regulations exist but no refinery outages occur. Comparing sim-
ulated prices in this counterfactual to those in the base case provides an estimate of
the magnitude of the outages in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. For example, to
estimate the effect of local refinery outages on California, I simulate gasoline prices in
California without outages and compare simulated prices with the simulated prices
from the base case (which include the outages). I then calculated the average differ-
ential between the two across all periods in which an unexpected outage occurred at
a California refinery. Table 2.9 lists estimates equivalent to those in Table 2.10, with
the exception that the counterfactual removes all outages as opposed to changing fuel
compatibility. The value in the upper left corner of Table 2.9 is the average price
differential in California between months in which a local outage occurred and those
same months but-for the outage. The point estimates for the effect of local refinery
outages are 6.7, 7.3 and 7.7 cents per gallon for California, Chicago and Milwaukee re-
spectively. This suggests that indeed, local refinery outages in Illinois and Wisconsin
over 1995 to 2001 were of greater magnitude than local outages in California.
The estimates in Table 2.9 provide a way to normalize the estimates of the effect
of fuel compatibility across states. Using the calculated magnitude of local outages
in California, Illinois and Wisconsin, I normalize the effect of incompatible content
regulations from Table 2.10 by the magnitude of the outage in Table 2.9. Calculating
the ratio of the effect of fuel incompatibility to the effect of the refinery outages gives
an estimate of the proportion of the effect of local outages which could be mitigated
if local content regulations met less stringent federal RFG standards. The proportion
mitigated by compatibility with federal RFG in California, Illinois and Wisconsin is
72', 91 and 92 percent respectively. That is, in California, of the 6.7 cent per gallon
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average simulated increase in price due to local outages, 4.8 cents of the increase (72
percent) would be avoided if CARB regulations were compatible with federal-RFG
standards. Thus, although refinery outages were of greater magnitude in Chicago
and Milwaukee than in California, fuel compatibility still has a larger effect on prices
contingent on a local refinery outage, even after controlling for outage magnitude.
Regardless, these results imply that price volatility from local refinery outages could
be substantially mitigated by content regulation compatible with federal RFG stan-
dards, especially in the case of Illinois and Wisconsin.
The greater degree to which gasoline compatibility mitigates price spikes in Chicago
and Milwaukee is consistent with product differentiation arising from both prod-
uct heterogeneity(ie. different content regulations) and geographic differentiation(ie.
transportation costs). Conceptually, the counterfactual simulates prices in California,
Illinois and Wisconsin removing product heterogeneity, but not geographic differen-
tiation. Whether compatibility mitigates the effect of supply shocks depends on the
extent to which California, Illinois and Wisconsin are geographically differentiated
from refineries producing federal RFG. Fuel compatibility only mitigates a supply
shocks if transportation costs from refiners producing RFG in other regions are suf-
ficiently low. If gasoline sold in Chicago and Milwaukee met federal RFG standards,
Gulf Coast refineries producing federal RFG for the East Coast could shift shipments
to Chicago and Milwaukee via low cost pipelines in response to a refinery outage in
Illinois. In contrast, these refineries, also the lowest cost non-local source of RFG for
California, ship by barge to California, incurring higher transportation costs. The
price differential between California and Texas must be greater to induce the same
amount of reallocation of RFG in response to a supply shock. Thus, higher transpo-
ration costs imply less mitigation of an outage-based price spike of similar magnitude.
This result indicates that virtually all of the product differentiation for Chicago and
Milwaukee ethanol-blended RFG is due to product heterogeneity. In constrast, both
product heterogeneity and geographic differentiation contribute to price spikes in
California.
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2.8.2 Additional Counterfactuals
In addition to simulating the effect of incompatible content regulations, I also sim-
ulate two other counterfactuals. First, I estimate the effect of changes in refinery
ownership over the 1995-2001 period on wholesale gasoline prices. Second, I simu-
late a counterfactual in which I increase the production capacity of all refineries, to
estimate the effect of declining reserve refining capacity.
Changes in Refinery Concentration
To simulate the effect of changes in refinery ownership, I simulate prices, holding
refinery ownership from January 1995 constant throughout the period. That is, I
simulate prices as if no changes in refinery ownership occurred. All refinery retire-
ments or capacity additions are kept identical to those actually observed. I first
calculate the average simulated prices under the counterfactual by PADD region (Ta-
ble 2.7) and product formulation (Table 2.8). Comparing the simulated prices for the
counterfactual to the simulated prices for the base case estimates the effect of refinery
consolidation on wholesale prices. Comparing the prices in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, mean
wholesale prices by region are between 0.9 (PADD 3) cents and 1.3 cents (PADD 4)
higher with actual refinery consolidation. Consolidation increases wholesale prices
on average from 0.7 cpg (CARB gasoline) to 1.5 cpg (Ethanol blended RFG). Thus,
the simulation results imply that even with refinery divestitures required as part of
mergers, changes in refinery ownership over this period increased prices.
I also estimate the effect of refinery ownership on gasoline price spikes caused by
local refinery outages. In Table 2.11, I present the average price differential between
the counterfactual and base case for CARB gasoline, Illinois RFG and Wisconsin
R.FG contingent and uncontingent on refinery outages. Contingent on a local outage,
industry consolidation has a much larger effect on ethanol-blended RFG (4.6 cpg in
Illinois) than on CARB gasoline (0.9 cpg in California). This suggests that refinery
ownership consolidation leads to a greater concentration of ethanol-blended RFG
production locally, relative to CARB gasoline production.
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Declining Reserve Refining Capacity
I also simulate a counterfactual testing the effect of declining reserve refining capac-
ity. That is, I estimate the price effect of capacity constraints on many of the largest
domestic refineries. I specify three counterfactuals, increasing light product produc-
tion capacity of all domestic refineries by 2.5%, 5% and 7.5%.41 Allowing capacity
to increase has two effects - it relaxes the binding capacity constraint at the most
efficient refineries and relaxes the binding capacity constraint in gasoline-importing
regions. Increasing refining capacity should reduce prices in all areas as production
is shifted to more efficient refineries but should also reduce prices relatively more
in gasoline-importing regions. As above, Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present the descriptive
statistics for the simulated counterfactual prices by geographic and product market
and Table 2.12 presents the simulated price differential between the counterfactual
and the base case, conditional and unconditional on refinery outages.
The results in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are consistent with ex ante predictions. Increasing
refinery capacity by five percent lowers prices in all geographic markets between 3.9
and 4.5 cents per gallon. In addition, the districts experiencing the largest price
reductions are the Rocky Mountain states (PADD 4 - 4.5 cpg) and New England
(PADD la- 4.3 cpg). Capacity-constrained geographic regions benefit from both
reallocation of production to the most efficient refineries and the relaxation of the
binding capacity constraint on local refineries. Areas with excess refining capacity
only benefit from the former.
Increasing production capacity of all refineries by five percent does not effect sub-
stantively which refineries produce CARB or ethanol-blended RFG gasoline. Thus,
the average price differentials reported in Table 2.12 contingent on a local outage and
contingent on no outages are statistically indistinguishable.
41 In the simulation, refinery cost functions are held constant, to control only for the effect of
relaxing the capacity constraint on refineries. Outages are scaled proportionately with increases in
capacity.
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2.8.3 Sensitivity Analyses
To test the robustness of the estimates in Section 8.1, I test the sensitivity of the sim-
ulated prices to the assumption that refiners place a zero probability prior on refinery
outages and to changes in the estimated cost, conduct and elasticity parameters.
Forward-Looking Refinery Optimization
To test sensitivity of the results to the assumption that refiners place a zero prior
probability on unexpected outages, I simulate a counterfactual in which each risk-
neutral refiner places a common, positive prior on outages at each refinery.42 Each
refiner incorporates these priors into her production choice in the first step of the
optimization problem. I constrain the continuum of all possible outages to a discrete
subset: single, refinery-wide outages. Given the production choices for each element
of the state space (each outage contingency), I identify the initial production choice
for each market which maximizes each refiner's expected profits. I then simulate
prices in each market assuming this initial choice is binding, but allow the refiners to
reallocate production in response to the actual refinery outages.
Table 2.13 and 2.14 compare descriptive statistics for simulated prices under base
case and forward-looking refinery optimization. Simulated mean prices for ethanol-
blended RFG and CARB gasoline are 0.45 cpg and 0.34 cpg lower when refinery
optimization decisions incorporate outages than when they do not. Conventional,
RFG, jet fuel and distillate mean prices are 0.11 cpg lower to 0.07 cpg higher with
expected profit maximization than with profit maximization. This is consistent with
ex ante expectations - since outages have the greatest effect on CARB and ethanol-
blended RFG, incorporating the possibility of outages will increase production of
CARB and ethanol-blended RFG more than other products.
When compared to the magnitude of the effect of incompatible regulations, though,
the modelling assumption I make has an effect an order of magnitude less that then
4 2 The common ex ante outage probability is consistent in expectation with the actual outages
observed over the study period. Numerically, the probability of a refinery-wide outages at each
refinery in each period is 0.0021.
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the effect of incompatible regulations. Several explanations exist for the relatively
small magnitude of the effect. First, while each refiner's priors of a refinery-wide
outage somewhere in the system in a given month is approximately twenty-five per-
cent, each refiner's priors of an outage at a specific refinery is much lower. Since
the prior probability of a local refinery outage in Illinois, Wisconsin or California is
relatively low, refiners rarely benefit from increasing production of CARB or ethanol-
blended RFG above the level of production modelled in the base case.43 Furthermore,
capacity constraints prevent many refiners from increasing production of CARB or
ethanol-blended RFG without decreasing production of another product. In choos-
ing to produce more CARB or ethanol-blended RFG, capacity-constrained refineries
weigh the benefits of incremental production in the event of a relevant local refinery
outage against the incremental production cost of the special gasoline blend and the
shadow cost of additional refining capacity.
Estimated Structural Parameters
In addition to testing the sensitivity of the simulation results to the assumption of
profit maximization, I also test the sensitivity of the results to variation in the struc-
tural parameter estimates. I focus on the six unobserved parameters which have the
largest effect on simulated CARB and ethanol-blended RFG prices: demand elastic-
ity (e), the competition coefficient (), the coefficient on crude oil price (2), RFG
production costs (3), ethanol-blended RFG production costs (4) and CARB pro-
duction costs (5). For each of the sensitivity tests, I bound the coefficients at two
standard deviations above and below the NLLS estimate reported in Table 2.4. Table
2.15 reports the differential price effect from gasoline content regulations contingent
on a local outage. The differentials reported in Table 2.15 are equivalent to the first
column in Table 2.10. Table 2.16 reports the percentage of local price volatility mit-
igated if CARB and ethanol-blended RFG regulations were compatible with federal
RFG.
43 Commnon refinery priors for an outage in Illinois or Wisconsin is 0.015 and for an outage in
California is 0.05.
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The first sensitivity analyses test the robustness of the estimates to changes in
the demand elasticity. The effect of content regulations contingent on a local outage
is positively correlated with demand elasticity. If demand curves are less elastic, a
supply shock of similar magnitude has a greater effect on prices. This is consistent
with the results in Table 2.15, in which the estimated effect of content regulations
contingent on a local outage decrease as demand becomes more elastic. In either case,
though, the estimated proportion of volatility from local outages mitigated by fuel
compatibility is relatively close to the results from the NLLS minimizing parameter
vector, 69 and 73 percent for California, 90 to 95 percent for Illinois and 89 to 94
percent for Wisconsin. In addition to the testing the sensitivity of the simulation
results to demand elasticities two standard errors above and below the NLLS point
estimate, I also test the robustness of the simulation results to demand elasticity
of -0.23, the median short-run gasoline demand elasticity estimate across the 363
estimates used for meta-analysis by Espey(1998). Again, the results are consistent
with the intuition that refinery outages will have a larger effect on prices as demand
becomes less elastic.
In general, the other sensitivity results presented in Table 2.15 are consistent
with the ex ante predictions. Two components drive how variations in the estimated
parameters affect estimates in Table 2.15: the incremental production costs associated
with the regional content regulations and the degree to which production of the special
blend is concentrated at local refineries. As a result, parameters affecting these two
factors have the greatest effect on the price differential between the base case and
counterfactual simulations. For example, cost coefficients on ethanol-blended RFG
and CARB should be positively correlated with the differentials reported in Table
2.15, since each represents the incremental production costs to refiners. Across the
sensitivity tests, the effect of compatibility contingent on local outages varies from
8.5 to 11.0 for California, 7.8 to 11.7 for Illinois and 8.2 to 12.3 for Wisconsin.
While the point estimates of the effect of content regulations contingent on a
local outage vary by twenty percent in some sensitivity tests, the percent of the price
volatility from a local outage mitigated by content regulations, reported in Table
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2.16, seems fairly robust to changes in the parameters. Across the sensitivity tests,
mitigation of local outages varies from 67 to 74 percent for California, 88 to 98
percent for Illinois and 90 to 99 percent for Wisconsin. This suggests that, although
the magnitude of the effect of content regulation does vary to a degree, the basic
conclusion is robust, that compatibility with federal RFG has the potential to mitigate
a significant proportion of the effect of local refinery outages, especially in Illinois and
Wisconsin.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I use a structural model of refinery production to estimate two effects
of regional gasoline content regulations on gasoline prices in California, Illinois and
Wisconsin. Using a constructed dataset of refinery outages, I am able to separate
the effect of the regulations on prices through increased production costs and the
effect of the regulations on prices through fuel incompatibility. Point estimates for
the effect of the former are 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents per gallon in California, Illinois and
Wisconsin. The effect of the latter, contingent on a local refinery outage, is estimated
as 4.8, 6.6 and 7.1 cents in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. Controlling for the
magnitude of local outages in these areas, I estimate that 72, 91 and 92 percent of
price spike created by a local refinery outage could be mitigated by compatibility
with federal reformulated gasoline. The sensitivity results in section 8 suggest that
the conclusions are robust to changes in parameter estimates and to the assumptions
of refiner's priors regarding the probability of unexpected outages. In particular, is
seems that across the sensitivity tests, in all cases gasoline compatibility with federal
RFG may play an important role in moderating price spikes from refinery outages in
California, Illinois and Wisconsin.
In addition, I simulate several counterfactuals to estimate the effects on wholesale
prices of changing refinery ownership over 1995 through 2001 and limited additions
to domestic refining capacity. I find that changes in refinery ownership increase prices
by 1.4 to 1.5 cpg in Illinois and Wisconsin and by 0.73 cents per gallon in California.
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A five-percent increase in domestic refining capacity reduces prices 3.7 to 3.8 cents
per gallon in Illinois and Wisconsin and 4.3 cents per gallon in California. Looking
across PADD districts, I find that increasing refining capacity lowers prices most in
regions which currently import petroleum products from other regions, namely the
Rocky Mountain states (PADD 4) and the East Coast (PADD 1).
'This study raises clear public policy implications. Back of the envelope calcula-
tions estimate the cost, through 2001, of content regulations incompatible with federal
RFG standards in California, Illinois and Wisconsin at $4.3 billion, $670 million and
$160 million respectively relative to federal RFG. Since the motivation for these reg-
ulations is to reduce air pollution, it is important to assess whether CARB gasoline
and ethanol-blended RFG constitute cost-effective methods for achieving this goal.
To the extent that supplementary content regulations imposed by these states have
little effect on mobile emissions, lower cost strategies may exist to reduce emissions
in these states.
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Table 2.2: Reduced Form Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Gasoline Prices
DTW Price
Rack Price
Retail Price
Gasoline Volumes
Conventional Volume
Oxygenated Volume
Reformulated Volume
Content Regulations
RFG Dummy
Oxygenated Dummy
Ethanol Blended RFG Dummy
Federal Phase 2 RFG Dummy
Federal Phase RFG Dummy
CARB Dummy
Mandatory Ethanol Dummy
Mandatory Oxygenation Percentage
Demand Instruments
State Population (millions)
Population Density
Per Capita Income (000s)
Total Licensed Drivers (millions)
Registered Autos Per Person
Registered Buses Per Person
Registered Motorcycles Per Person
State Tax
Federal Gasoline Tax
Cents Per Gallon Tax
Crude Spot Prices
Cushing WTI Spot Price
Brent North Shore Spot Price
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
79.31
71.99
87.83
5,319.3
2,053.5
4,746.8
0.31
0.22
0.02
0.05
0.25
0.01
0.04
0.45
7.28
190.6
23.82
3.87
0.70
0.00
0.03
19.83
18.36
38.19
50.50
46.91
17.81
17.73
18.23
4,640.1
2,539.6
4,996.7
0.46
0.41
0.13
0.22
0.43
0.09
0.19
0.88
7.50
252.2
4.56
4.03
0.10
0.00
0.01
4.99
0.05
4.99
11.22
11.23
37.90
34.40
47.40
97.4
0.6
0.9
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.63
1.1
15.22
0.34
0.43
0.00
0.01
7.50
18.30
25.80
26.99
23.39
151.80
147.90
159.70
21,916.1
15,720.7
40,564.6
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
3.50
33.90
1,143.7
40.64
22.40
0.96
0.01
0.07
39.00
18.40
57.30
81.95
78.57
Table 2.3: Reduced-Form Regressions Results
Dependent Variable: Monthly Average Real Rack Price Net of State and Federal Taxes (cents/gallon)
Specification
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CONSTANT 12.550** 61.237** 6.617**
1.377 0.721 1.428
QUANTITY 0.00047** -0.00058** -0.00037*
0.00015 0.00009 0.00013
WTI MONTHLY CRUDE PRICE 1.159** 1.177**
0.013 0.009
OXYDUMMY 3.495** 4.696** 4.947**
0.754 0.437** 0.513
RFGDUMMY 3.839** 4.065** 4.238**
0.552 0.261 0.354
RFGETHDUMMY ^ 1.836 1.855* 1.675
1.793 0.833 1.118
CARBDUMMY ^ 3.184 5.646** 5.050*
2.036 1.677 1.974
Geographic Dummy Variables
Temporal Dummy Variables
Autocorrelation Coefficient
Errors
State
Common
Heteroskedastic
State
Month-Year
Common
Heteroskedastic
State
State-Month
Common
Heteroskedastic
R-Squared
Estimated Rho
0.7902
0.615
0.9390
0.534
0.8722
0.471
Notes:
* denotes significance at 5% level
** denotes significance at 1% level
A Both Ethanol requirements for gasoline and CARB gasoline requirements are treated additively to the RFGDUMM)
(e.g. Holding all else equal, CARB gasoline prices are greater than conventional gasoline
prices by the sum of the coefficients on RFGDUMMY and CARBDUMMY.)
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics by PADD and Estimation Technique
PADD Region
la lb Ic 2 3 4 5
Actual Prices
Mean 69.56 68.82 66.74 70.35 66.12 74.84 74.91
Standard Deviation 16.67 16.95 16.36 18.28 16.61 17.26 18.82
Max 121.00 119.30 116.20 147.90 114.20 124.20 130.80
Min 34.50 33.40 34.00 34.70 31.60 38.40 40.20
Estimated Prices - Structural Model
Mean 71.17 67.62 67.35 69.92 68.99 73.29 75.14
Standard Deviation 14.73 14.74 14.67 16.64 15.56 17.39 16.99
Max 108.45 104.37 104.16 117.02 108.55 117.57 128.56
Min 35.06 32.50 32.60 33.63 32.52 33.33 33.20
Estimated Prices - Reduced Form Model 1
Mean 70.82 70.42 67.93 70.89 68.48 75.52 76.94
Standard Deviation 16.50 16.89 16.75 17.13 16.71 16.20 16.69
Max 118.94 117.73 116.01 120.73 117.94 123.52 125.96
Min 38.05 36.02 35.55 36.04 34.85 39.86 43.00
Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics by Formulation and Estimation Technique
Formulation
Ethanol- CARB
Conventional RFG Blended RFG Gasoline Jet Fuel Distillate
Actual Prices
Mean 70.24 72.54 75.85 81.81 65.72 64.35
Standard Deviation 17.25 17.75 19.69 20.81 16.96 17.13
Max 129.20 139.30 147.90 130.80 115.80 120.30
Min 34.40 38.50 43.00 49.40 31.60 31.70
Estimated Prices - Structural Model
Mean 69.88 73.28 76.83 87.49 66.98 65.12
Standard Deviation 15.94 15.30 17.19 16.50 15.42 15.61
Max 117.57 118.64 117.02 128.56 111.61 109.41
Min 34.48 39.04 45.37 49.59 32.93 32.50
Estimated Prices - Reduced Form Model 1
Mean 70.52 72.69 75.75 82.59
Standard Deviation 16.87 17.03 17.32 17.85
Max 124.94 125.96 120.73 125.76
Min 34.85 39.31 43.36 49.39
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Table 2.9: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due to Unexpected Refinery Outages
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
Conditional on Outage Type
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 6.68 0.07 0.85
(0.08) (0.001) (0.02)
Illinois 7.28 2.38 -0.02 0.88
(0.27) (0.04) (0.08) (0.13)
Wisconsin 7.72 3.47 0.00 1.46
(0.28) (0.07) (0.10) (0.16)
Table 2.10: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due to Fuel Compatibility
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
Conditional on Outage Type
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 9.26 4.46 5.36
(0.47) (0.40) (0.43)
Illinois 9.57 4.71 2.97 3.76
(0.72) (0.76) (0.83) (0.70)
Wisconsin 9.92 5.01 2.86 4.17
(0.71) (0.79) (0.84) (0.68)
Table 2.11: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due to Refinery Consolidation
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
Conditional on Outage Type
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 1.41 0.54 0.73
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
Illinois 6.02 1.30 0.39 1.40
(0.58) (0.21) (0.08) (0.17)
Wisconsin 5.45 1.11 0.65 1.54
(0.56) (0.21) (0.10) (0.19)
Table 2.12: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due from Five Percent Increase in Refining Capacity
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
Conditional on Outage Type
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 3.90 4.47 4.27
(0.51) (0.29) (0.32)
Illinois 3.85 4.31 3.86 3.78
(1.27) (1.08) (0.18) (0.18)
Wisconsin 3.91 4.39 3.85 3.75
(1.21) (1.08) (0.22) (0.22)
Note: Local outages for Califomrnia are defined as in-state outages. Local outages for Illinois and Wisconsin are defined as
outages in either Illinois or Wisconsin. Regional outages for Illinois and Wisconsin are non-local outages occurring within PADD 2 (IL, Wl).
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Chapter 3
Endogenous Facility Reliability:
Evidence From Oil Refinery Fires
3.1 Introduction
Regulatory agencies are often directed to conduct informal studies or formal investiga-
tions of unregulated markets in which prices fluctuate dramatically. Recent examples
include a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study of the Midwest Gasoline Price
Spikes in the Spring of 2000 and a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
study of the California electricity market during the summer of 2000. The primary
objective of each of the studies is to identify factors which led to high prices in each
market - as part of this analysis, both the FTC and FERC studies discuss whether or
not evidence exists that producers in each market withheld output in order to raise
prices.
One of the challenges of identifying evidence of explicit withholding by producers
in markets is identifying whether or not reductions in supply are strategic or simply
the result of unanticipated shocks which affect production. In the California electricity
market during the summer of 2000, for example, a number of generating plants were
unavailable for production at times when prices were high. The FERC report discusses
this as am important factor, while recognizing difficulties with determining whether
or not this unavailability was strategic in nature.
115
An increased level of unplanned outages at generating plants is another
key factor limiting available generation supply in 2000... There are several
potential explanations for the increased level of outages... One possibility
is that fewer resources are being devoted to planned maintenance... A final
possibility is just the opposite: owners could be withholding by taking
plants out of service at critical times to drive up prices.1
The inability of regulators to verify whether or not "unplanned" outages an-
nounced by producers are actually voluntarily withheld production presents a sig-
nificant problem for policy makers assessing the competitiveness of these markets.
Joskow and Kahn(2002) and Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak(2002) study high elec-
tricity prices in California during the summer of 2000. Both studies simulate compet-
itive prices for electricity and then compare simulated and actual prices to quantify
the proportion of the high electricity prices attributable to market power. Although
neither study is able distinguish if "the units were suffering from unusual operation
problems or they were being withheld from the market to increase prices,"2 both
investigate whether outage patterns are consistent with a model of strategic with-
holding. Joskow and Kahn find evidence of below capacity production at all suppliers
in California, with the exception of the generator which signed long-term forward
contracts with distribution companies and, consequently, had the least incentive to
withhold production from the spot electricity market.
Harvey, Hogan and Schatzki(2004) study outages at Mirant's generating plants in
California during 2000 and similarly test whether the production during this period
is consistent with strategic withholding. Estimates from their hazard model suggest
that, although the level of unplanned outages was higher during this period, the
increase was due to extended periods of operation without maintenance prior to and
during the summer of 2000. They conclude that, although anecdotal evidence may
suggest that some strategic withholding occurred in California, after controlling for
1Source: FERC Staff Report on Western Markets and the Causes of the Summer 2000 Price
Abnormalities - Part I, Section 2, November 1, 2000.
2See Joskow and Kahn at 3
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maintenance schedules, Mirant's actual production during this period was higher than
the hazard model predicts.
In this paper, I propose an alternative explanation for why a correlation may
exist between the incentives for withholding and facility reliability, absent strategic
withholding by producers. I specify a model in which a firm's choice of output and
maintenance affect the likelihood that a facility will be available for operation. Al-
lowing for endogenous outage probability, I study the effect of ownership of more
than one facility in a geographic market on facility operation, and hence outages.
Intuitively, even if it is not unilaterally profitable for a firm to strategically withhold
production from the market, if unanticipated outages increase prices, the incentives
to operate and maintain facilities will differ for firms that own more than one facility.
In order to study the effect of incentives on unplanned outages, I study fires, ex-
plosions and other unanticipated incidents at domestic oil refineries. Importantly,
unlike outages at power plants, these incidents are also verifiable, and thus, it is rea-
sonable to think of them as unrelated to explicit strategic withholding by refiners.
I construct a dataset of characteristics and ownership of domestic oil refineries and
collect data on unanticipated incidents at the refineries. I then estimate the probabil-
ity of an unanticipated incident occurring as a function of the amount of additional
local refining capacity owned by the refinery owner. I find evidence consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical model - that a positive correlation exists between
ownership of more than one refinery in an area and the probability of unanticipated
events. Moreover, the relationship between expected incident probability and owner-
:ship is greatest in markets with special gasoline formulations, which are the markets
in which a refinery outage has the largest effect of gasoline prices. In these markets, I
estimate that the expected probability of an unplanned incident is 30 percent greater
for an affiliated refinery than it is for an unaffiliated refinery. My analysis, though,
cannot identify a causal relationship between the two - I am unable to rule out the
possibility that the correlation I identify arises from refiner selection of a portfolio of
assets based on facility-specific incident probability observable by the refiner.
This paper also provides descriptive statistics regarding refinery fires and explo-
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sions. To the extent that refinery incidents affect prices of refined petroleum products,
this information provides the descriptive statistics regarding facility supply shocks
affecting domestic refining of crude oil, useful to policy makers projecting refinery
availability.
Section 2 discusses the previous academic literature related to facility reliabil-
ity. In Section 3, I present a model in which ownership of more than one facility
affects the facility reliability and present several testable implications of the model.
In Section 4, I describe my dataset as well as provide descriptive statistics about the
refinery outages I identify. Section 5 presents my econometric approach, results and
sensitivity tests of my model. Section 6 summarizes the findings and discusses policy
implications.
3.2 Relevant Literature
A number of related papers study markets or models in which production availabil-
ity is uncertain. The literature focuses primarily on the electricity industry and is
broadly organized into papers studying the effects of exogenously uncertain produc-
tion on prices and welfare3 , and papers considering either market-level or firm-level
factors affecting the availability or reliability of supply. Papers studying market-
level incentives include theoretical papers (e.g., Fraser(1994)) and empirical paper
(e.g., Sturm(1995)). Fraser derives optimal monopolist production and reliability
provision under price-caps which do or do not incorporate incentives for service reli-
ability. Sturm specifies a structural model of nuclear power plant failure and repair.
Sturm uses panel data on European nuclear power plant operation and maintenance
to explain differences in availability and reliability across different countries. Sturm
estimates costs of planned refueling outages and unplanned outages and interprets
3For example, Saving and DeVany(1981) identify optimal peak-load prices in a market with
exogenous supply shocks. Kleindorfer and Fernando(1993) derive the welfare effect exogenous supply
shocks in a market in which demand is a function of both price and reliability. Tishler(1993) derives
and estimates costs from uncertain electricity supply on a sample of industries which use electricity
as an input to production.
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differences in costs across countries as different national incentive schemes for perfor-
mance. Sturm then simulates production under different cost parameters to identify
the effect of cost incentives on performance.
Unlike studies of market-level incentives, this paper focuses on facility-level incen-
tives for operation and reliability, arising from ownership of more than one refinery in
a geographic market. In estimating facility-level reliability from variation in facility-
level incentives, the most closely related literature is Joskow and Rozanski(1979),
Joskow and Schmalensee(1988) and Rothwell(1996), all of which study the facility-
level operation and reliability of electric generating plants. Joskow and Rozanski test
for evidence of learning-by-doing in both the operation and construction of nuclear
power plants. While Joskow and Rozanski look at output rather than plant outages,
they do identify improving availability rates for nuclear power plants consistent with
learning. In addition, after controlling for plant vintage and learning, they find lower
availability rates for large power plants relative to small power plants. Joskow and
Schmalensee focus on efficiency and availability of coal-fired power plants, and esti-
mate vintage and age effects, as well as generator-specific effects for generators with
internal construction and engineering groups. Rothwell studies the effect of changes in
organizational hierarchy at a set of domestic nuclear power plants. Rothwell estimates
separate hazard functions for both operation and repair and finds some evidence that
horizontal as opposed to vertical hierarchy improves the duration of operation at
nuclear plants.
This paper approaches facility reliability from an incentive perspective - that is,
if the operation of a refinery has an effect on the likelihood of unplanned outages,
changes in ownership that affect the operation of refineries will also impact outage
probability. This relationship, between ownership incentives and unanticipated out-
ages, is not addressed by the previous literature. Covering a period with a number of
horizontal mergers within the petroleum industry, many of which involved regulatory-
driven divestitures, I exploit variation arising from changes in ownership to identify
the effect on the probability of refinery fires or explosions.
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3.3 A Model of Endogenous Reliability
I model a static game in which firms choose strategic variables that affect facility
reliability. Applied to the refining industry, I consider refiners choosing output and
maintenance, both of which might affect the probability of a fire or explosion. I then
consider the incentives for the choice of output and maintenance, as a function of
whether or not a firm owns more than one facility in a geographic market.
Consider N symmetric risk-neutral facilities, indexed by i {1, 2, ... , N}. Ini-
tially, I consider the case in which each facility is owned by a different firm. Firms
play a single period static game in which they simultaneously choose two strate-
gic variables: output of a homogenous good denoted qi and the extent of main-
tenance mi.4 I assume the costs of output and maintenance are separable, where
c(qj, m ) = c(qi) + cm(mi) and c' cp C'm C" > 0.' Let q = [q, q2,.. .,q] and m
[m1 , m2,... ,mn] denote the vectors of the choices of output and maintenance of all
N firms.
To incorporate facility reliability, I assume that firm choice of qi and mi affect
the probability that facility i is available for operation. Letting xi denote a random
Bernoulli variable identifying whether a facility is available for operation,
xi = with probability Ai(qi, mi)
= 0 with probability 1 - Ai(qi,mi).
where Ao, o2A >0 and i, ,2,_2 < 0. Letting X = [, 2, . . XN] be the vector cre-O~qij I .qi 2 -- mi mi 2 -- 
ated by independent realizations of the N Bernoulli variables, let the inverse demand
curve faced by firm i, given by
Pi(q, X) = Pi(qlxl, q2x2,..., qNXN),
4A two-step game consisting of sequential choice of maintenance followed by output is analogous
to the entry game studied in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), in which refiners follow a "Top Dog"
strategy, initially overinvesting in maintenance to improve their competitive position at the beginning
of the second stage of the game.
5I assume cost-separability for expositional convenience. Allowing for maintenance costs to be a
function of both mi and qi does not change the implications of the model.
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be a function of the production of all facilities after the realization of X.6 Thus,
a firm owning facility i chooses qi and mi to maximize expected profit, where the
expectation is taken with respect to X and is given by
Ex [lIi (q, m)] = Ex[P (q,X)xiqi - cp(xiqi) - cm(mi)]
Conditioning on the realization of xi, the expected profit is
Ex[ni(q,nm)] = iEx[i(qX)xiqilxi = 1]- AiCp(qi)-(1- Ai)cp(O)- cm(mi).7
Taking the derivative of expected profit with respect to qi and mi, I define the best
response function of firm i given the choices of the other N - 1 firms. The joint
solution q (qi, m) and m (q, mi) that set the first-order conditions equal to zero
defines the reaction functions of firm i.
OEx [Hi] [OEx[Pi(q, X)xiqi xi 1] Cp(qi)1
oqi = qi ± qi 
+ 9Ai [Ex[Pi(q, X)xiqi xi = 1]- (cp(qi) - cp(0))]
Oqi
=0
8Ex [Iil] _ Ai I _Cm (T/i)
ami - ,mn am
- -dm = ,omiEx [Pi(q, X)x qilxi-= 1]-m 0Ai V)-pO) 9 
= O.
The terms of the first-order conditions can be interpreted as either direct effects on
profits of refinery i or as indirect effects of profits through changes in facility reliability.
In the case of the first order condition for qi, the first term line is the direct effect of
an increase in output on expected profits. The second line is the the indirect effect of
6 With homogenous goods and no transportation costs, all facilities face an identical inverse de-
mnand curve, P(q, X) = P(Zi xiqi). Letting the inverse demand curve faced by each facility vary
allows for transportation costs between spatially differentiated facilities or production of differenti-
ated goods.
7I denote the cost of an outage as cp(O), the cost of planned production equal to zero. Functional
form assumptions on outage costs do not affect the incentive conclusions.
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an increase in output on expected profits arising from a change in facility reliability.
If output has no effect on reliability, that is if Ai = 0, no indirect effect exists, andO9qi
the FOC for qi reduces to the standard FOC for a firm choosing quantity. In choosing
mi, the maintenance levels at the facility, the firm weighs the marginal increase in
expected profits associated with an increase in maintenance investment and hence
reliability against the marginal cost of increasing maintenance. If maintenance does
not affect facility reliability, the FOC for maintenance reduces to c = satisfied at
mi = 0 by restrictions placed on the first and second derivatives of cm.8
I now consider the case where two of the N facilities are owned by a single firm.
Specifically, I consider the maximization problem faced by a firm owning two facilities
i and j, competing against N - 2 independent firms each owning a single facility.
The firm now chooses qi, qj, mi and mj so as to maximize the expected joint profits of
facilities i and j. Let EX[I-IHI = Ex [Ili]+Ex[Ij] denote the profits of the horizontally
integrated firm, the joint profits of facilities i and j.
Consider the choice of output and maintenance for facility i. Conditioning on the
realization of the Bernoulli variables for facility i and j, Ex[HH] can be separated
into the sum of four conditional expectations corresponding to the joint realization
of (xi, xj). Expressing Ex[IIH] as a conditional expectation of the four possible real-
izations of (xi, xj), and grouping terms,
EX[IH] = AiAj(qiEx[Pi(q,X) xi, xj = 1] + qjEx[Pj(q,X)lxi,x j = 1])
+Ai( - )j)qiEx[P(q,X) xi = 1,xj = 0]
+Aj (1 - Ai)qjEx[P(q,X) xi = O, xj = 1] - cm(mi) - cm(mj)
-Aip(qi) - (1 - Ai)cp(O)- Ajcp(qj) - (1 - Aj)cp(O).
Let oEx[ll denote the first order condition for output of facility i if it were ownedOqi
8 Second-derivative assumptions on cost of production, cost of maintenance and reliability ensure
q* (qi, mi, mi) and m* (q-i, mi, qi) are functions and not correspondences. It is important to note
that for a given facility, more than choice of (mi, qi) given (mi, q-i) may jointly solve the FOCs.
For this paper, I do not consider actual choice of equilibria, but simply evaluate changes in incentives
in the choice of (mi, qi) at a given equilibrium depending on whether or not facility i is affiliated
with another refinery.
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by an unintegrated firm. Taking the partial derivative of Ex [IJH] with respect to qi,
wve have the first order condition for q, given by
OaEx [HH] Ex [u] A Ex [Pj (q, X) xi, j = 1]
= Oqi + A9Aqq aqi
-q Ajqj (Ex [Pj (q, X) x = 0, xj = 1]- Ex [Pj(q,X) x,xj = 1])
= O.
For a given (q-i, m-i, mi), ownership of two facilities changes the optimal output of
facility i. In addition to the terms for an unintegrated facility, two additional terms
affect output choice of facility i . The first is the standard horizontal integration result,
that facility i incorporates the effect of its choice of output on the expected profits of
facility j. The sign on the term is negative implying that, by itself, internalization of
the effect on the profits of facility j would lead facility i to choose output below the
output level chosen in the unintegrated case. The second term captures the indirect
effect on the profits of facility j. If a change in the output of facility i affects the
reliability of facility i, a firm maximizing the joint profits of i and j will internalize
this effect. For general ' < 0, the effect of integration has an ambiguous result onaqi
output relative to the unintegrated case.'
Considering the choice of mi, let EX [nu] denote the first order condition for main-
ami
tenance of facility i if it were owned by an unintegrated firm. The first-order condition
for the choice of maintenance at facility i is given by
aEx [.]1 a s [nvu] O&i
:Em -d -[HIIjE [lj A-qEx[Pj (q,X) xi = 0, xj = 1]
ami 9mri Orri7
+ ai AjqjEx[Pj (q, X) xi, x3 = 1]
= O.
In the case of maintenance, the only effect internalized in a firm owning facilities
9 Under a linear demand curve, the sign of the effect on output choice of an integrated facility
relative to the unintegrated facility is given by the sign of -Ai - qi. From the assumption thatqi
9q > . and increase in production relative to the unintegrated case implies a decrease in facility
reliability. This condition relaxes for a convex demand curve, such as goods with production or
transportation constraints such as electricity or petroleum.
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i and j is the effect on the profits of facility j from an increase in reliability of
facility i. Hence, we can unambiguously sign the effect of integration on the choice
of maintenance - for given (q, mi), the profit maximizing choice of mi weakly falls
relative to the unintegrated case.10
Four testable predictions arise from the model. First, under certain functional
form conditions, it is possible to sign the effect of horizontal integration on output
and hence reliability. If output has no effect on reliability or a affiliated facility
increases production relative to an unaffiliated facility, joint ownership will weakly
decrease facility reliability. Second, the magnitude of the incentives depend on the
degree to which production from a facility affects the price earned by an affiliated
facility. Joint ownership of nearby facilities, where Ex [Pj (q, X) xi 0, xj = 1]-
Ex[Pj(q, X)lxi, xj = 1] is large, will have a greater effect on reliability than those
selling into unrelated markets. l l This prediction is similar to the third and fourth
predictions of the model, that joint ownership of facilities will have a greater effect
on reliability in markets or at times in which an outage has a larger effect on prices.
Incentives from affiliation will be greater in markets in which a facility outage has a
large effect on prices. In the case of gasoline, incentives from affiliation will be greater
for products with few substitutes, such as special gasoline blends, or in geographic
markets with substantial transportation costs. Finally, if inventories fluctuate over
time or transportation and capacity constraints are more binding in certain months,
the model predicts that the incentives arising from horizontal integration will be
greater in these months.
0 In this formulation, it is important to note that both choice variables, output and maintenance,
are strategic substitutes.
I1 1n this paper, differentiation of facilities arise from transportation costs between geographic
markets. This prediction, though, has a clear analog for differentiated products. Joint ownership
of facilities producing close substitutes create stronger distortions away from decisions made by
unaffiliated facilities.
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3.4 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
I collect two sets of data to study the extent to which incentives help to explain refinery
fires and explosions: (i) news or regulatory reports of refinery incidents, and (ii) a
comprehensive dataset of refinery production capacity, ownership and geography.
From January 1995 through June 2002, I identify 120 unanticipated incidents
occurring at refineries. The incidents include fires, explosions, lightning strikes and
other events which may be related to facility operation. The incidents are plausibly
unanticipated and, in contrast with unplanned outages at power plants, are verifiable.
Events which are both unanticipated and verifiable reduce concerns that events are
misreported by firms as a way to withhold output strategically. I identify incidents by
searching local, regional and national news sources, filings by the US Chemical Safety
Board, filings by publicly-traded refining companies to the SEC, and reports from
the Acusafe Incident Database. Table 3.1 contains a list of the identified incidents I
use as part of the econometric analyses which follow. While refinery incidents vary in
magnitude dramatically, from large fires and explosions which require repairs to much
smaller incidents which do not affect production, I do not explicitly differentiate fires
and explosions based on magnitude for purposes of this analysis.1 2
I also construct a dataset of refinery-level characteristics for domestic refineries
from January 1995 to December 2001. I collect data on refinery location and capacity
of production units at each refinery from issues of the Energy Information Adminis-
tration (EIA) Annual Refinery Report. Following my methodology in Chapter Two, I
construct an estimate of the light-product production capacity at each refinery based
on the capacity of various production units at each refinery.13 The EIA also tracks
: 2 Approximately half of the incidents required documented repairs and reduced production ca-
pacity. It is this subset of incidents which I use to investigate the effect of supply shocks on gasoline
markets in Chapter 2.
13 Light product production capacity is defined as the sum of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel fuel
production. I approximate light product capacity by forty percent of distillation capacity plus
the sum of hydrocracking, thermal cracking and catalytic cracking capacity. This provides a better
approximation of actual refinery production capacity of high-quality products than simple distillation
capacity.
125
changes in ownership within the refining industry in the Petroleum Supply Monthly.
Combining changes in refinery ownership with production capacity at each refinery
allows me to track, on a monthly basis, the production capacity at each refinery and
also production capacity of all other assets owned by the same refiner.
Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics of refinery characteristics based on the
population of monthly observations at all 173 domestic refineries open at some point
during from January 1995 to December 2001. Mean light product capacity at domestic
refineries is 3.98 million gallons per day, substantially greater than median refinery
capacity of 2.25 million gallons per day. Average total production capacity summed
across all refineries is 613 million gallons per day.
As indicated by the summary statistics, incidents at refineries are relatively rare.
The probability of an unplanned incident at a given refinery in a given month is 0.9
percent with 0.7 incidents occurring on average at each facility over the seven-year
period. During the study period, unanticipated incidents occurred at 65 of the 173
domestic refineries with more than one incident occurring at 34 refineries. Separating
the sample by quartiles based on production capacity, I find that the average number
of incidents at refineries is positively correlated with the production capacity of the
refinery. Of the 120 incidents identified four incidents occurred at refineries in the
lowest quartile of the production capacity distribution, fourteen incidents occurred
at refineries in the second quartile, thirty-three incidents occurred at refineries in the
third quartile and sixty-nine incidents occurred at refineries in the upper quartile.
Geographically by Petroleum Area Defense Districts (PADDs), statistically more in-
cidents occurred at refineries in PADD 1 (East Coast) and PADD 2 (Midwest) than
at refineries in other areas.
Aggregating across refineries, 1.3 unplanned outages occur on average in each
month. Like the distribution of incidents across refineries, substantial variation exists
in the number of incidents from month to month. Incidents occurred in fifty-one of
the eighty-four months in the study period - in months with an incident, the number
of incidents varied from one or two in many months to six incidents in July 2001.
Figure 3.1 graphs the number of unanticipated incidents I identify by month and
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year. Of the 120 incidents identified, 102 were fires or explosions at refineries. Of
the remaining 18 incidents: seven were caused by lightning, three by complications
associated with planned maintenance, three were chemicals releases, three were power
outages and two were described only as "unplanned" maintenance. Figure 3.2 graphs
the incidents identified in the data by the type of incident and the month of occur-
rence for incidents from January 1995 through December 2001.14 Incidents exhibit
substantial seasonality - although fires and explosions make up the majority of inci-
dents, they are more prevalent in the summer. In addition, six of the seven incidents
involving lightning occurred in May, June or July.
3.5 Econometric Model and Results
I specify a reduced-form model to estimate the correlation between ownership of
multiple refining assets and the probability of an unplanned refinery outage at a
given refinery. The goal is to test if the pattern of incidents at refineries is consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical model. The probability of an outage at refinery
i in month t, is given by
Prob(Yt = 1) = f(3Xit) + it
where Xit denotes a vector of variables related to the capacity factors of other facilities
owned by the refinery owning refiner i, and Yit is a discrete variable equal to one if
an incident occurs at refinery i and time t and E(EitlXit) = 0.
I use a standard probit specification where
x2
E(YItlXit) := -c 2dx
For the initial regressions, summarized in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I include several sets
of variables to test whether the pattern of incidents at refineries during the study
period is consistent with the second, third and fourth predictions of the theoretical
1 4For Figure 3.2, I exclude identified events occurring from January 2002 to July 2002, so that
each month is represented equally.
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model. The second prediction of the theoretical model is that incentives arising from
joint-ownership depend on the geographic proximity of affiliated refineries. I use
separate geographic definitions to differentially treat refining capacity near and far
from a given refinery. Differentiating by spatial proximity also allows me to rule out
changes in facility reliability which might arise from global economies or diseconomies
of scale in the provision of maintenance.
I construct two separate sets of proxies for incentives arising from joint ownership
related to geographic proximity. The first set, used in the specifications in Table 3.3,
is the sum of all other production capacity owned by the firm within state, outside
of the state but within PADD (Petroleum Area Defense District) and outside of the
PADD. For example, consider a refiner owning four refineries, A, B, C and D, where
A and B are in the same state, and A, B and C are in the same PADD. For refinery
A, the in-state variable is given by the capacity of refinery B, the out of state but
within PADD proxy is given by the capacity of refinery C, and the out of PADD
proxy is given by the capacity of refinery D. For the second set of proxy variables,
used in Table 3.4, I normalize the three initial proxies by total production capacity
for the relevant geographic region. Again considering the hypothetical refiner above,
for refinery A, the percent of in-state refining capacity is the capacity of B divided by
total refining capacity within state. The percent of refining capacity out-of-state but
within PADD is the capacity of refinery C normalized by total refining capacity out-of-
state but within-PADD. Normalizing by total production capacity weights ownership
in a particular region relative to total ownership within the region. By normalizing
in such a way, I better capture incentives arising from joint ownership since owning
a small amount of additional capacity in a small market might create very similar
incentives to owning a larger amount of capacity in a more competitive market. In
either case, the model predicts ownership of two refineries in the same state should
have a larger effect on operation than owning two refineries in the same PADD which
would likewise have a larger effect on operation than owning two refineries in different
PADDs.
The third prediction of the theoretical model states that operational incentives
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arising from joint-ownership are greater in markets in which an outage has a large
effect on prices. Thus, I also include an interaction term of in-state refining capacity
with a dummy variable corresponding to months in which California, Chicago and
Milwaukee use special blends of gasoline. As studied in Chapter Two, refinery outages
have a larger effect on prices in markets with special content regulations, such as
California, Illinois and Wisconsin. Thus, affiliation of capacity in markets with and
without special regulations should have different incentive implications than similar
affiliation in markets without special regulations.
The final prediction of the model is if demand varies over the course of the year,
months in which an outage has a larger effect should also be months in which in-
centives to operate affiliated facilities are most different from incentives to operate
unaffiliated facilities. Thus, in addition to the ownership variables described above, I
include either seasonal or monthly dummy variables, allowing outage probability to
vary over the course of the year. Gasoline demand and prices rise during the summer
"driving" season. A finding that unplanned incidents are more prevalent in the sum-
mer is consistent with the implications of the theoretical model. If output is related
to incident probability or if the incentives for output and maintenance vary in high
and low demand periods, a prediction that incidents are more likely in the summer
might provide some anecdotal support of the theoretical model. Before using season-
ality as indirect evidence, though, I account for incidents with a seasonal component
unrelated to operation or maintenance of a facility. In particular, incidents related
to lightning may potentially bias seasonal coefficients in favor of the implications of
the theoretical model - lightning is both plausibly exogenous to operation or mainte-
nance, as well as strongly seasonal. 5 To avoid biasing the coefficients on seasonal or
monthly dummy variables in a way consistent with the implications of the theoretical
model, I exclude lightning-related incidents from the probit regression. I also exclude
the three incidents related to planned maintenance and two incidents described sim-
ply as "unplanned outages". Based on my research, I was not able to verify that
15(f the seven lightning-related incidents in the data, three incidents occurred in June, two in
May and one in July.
129
the "unplanned outages" were in fact unanticipated and, thus, unrelated to explicit
strategic behavior. Of the 110 incidents in my data occurring between January 1995
and December 2001, I use 95 fires, explosions, chemical releases and power outages.16
Table 3.3 contains estimated coefficients based on the probit regression of the
occurrence of an incident at refinery i in month j on the first proxy for ownership
incentives, seasonal or monthly fixed-effects, and capacity of refinery i. The first
specification excludes the capacity variable. Specifications (1) and (2) include refinery
capacity as well as seasonal and monthly fixed-effects. Specification (3) and (4) add a
cross-term of instate refining capacity and a California, Illinois or Wisconsin location
dummy variable.
The point estimates for coefficients are roughly consistent with several of the
predictions of the theoretical model: (i) Incentives arising from ownership of two
refineries in closely related geographic markets are stronger than incentives from joint-
ownership of refineries in distant geographic markets, (ii)Incentives arising from joint-
ownership are greatest for products for which incidents have the greatest effect on
prices, and (iii) Incentives arising from joint-ownership are stronger in months in
which an outage has a larger effect on market prices . In specifications (1) and (2),
the point estimate of the coefficient on in-state refining capacity are positive and
greater than that of out-of-state, within-PADD refining capacity as well as out-of-
PADD refining capacity, although all three point estimates are imprecisely estimated.
Moreover, in specification (3) and (4), the point estimate of the coefficient on the
cross term of instate refining capacity and the CA, IL and WI dummy variable is also
positive and of greater magnitude than the coefficient on instate refining capacity.
Although again, the coefficient is imprecisely estimated, the relative size of the two
terms is consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model - controlling for
refinery size, the probability of an outage at a facility owned by a refiner with nearby
refineries is greater than that at a facility owned by a refiner with no proximate
refining assets.
16I test the robustness of my results to inclusion or exclusion of these other types of incidents and
find that changing the sample of incidents does not have a substantively change my results.
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The coefficients on the seasonal and monthly dummy variables are robust across
the different specifications. The coefficient on summer is positive and significant, as
well as statistically greater than the coefficients on spring and fall. While the point
estimates on the monthly coefficients are imprecisely estimated, they follow a similar
pattern - the expectation of refinery fires or explosions rises in the summer months
and falls in winter months. 17
Table 3.4 presents the estimated coefficients for the normalized proxies for joint
ownership incentives, temporal fixed-effects and refinery capacity. Specifications (1)
through (4) in Table 3.4 replicate the specifications in Table 3.3. In each, I regress
incident occurrence on refinery capacity, the second set of ownership proxies, and
seasonal or monthly fixed-effects. The econometric results are similar to those in
Table 3.3. The coefficient on capacity is again positive and highly significant. The
likelihood of a fire or explosion exhibits seasonality - fires and explosions are more
likely in the summer than the winter. In addition, the coefficients on the proxies
for incentives arising from joint ownership are consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model - other refining capacity owned in-state has a larger effect on the
probability of an outage than refining capacity outside the state but within the PADD.
in specifications (3) and (4), when I include the cross term of in-state refining capacity
and the dummy variable for specialized local gasoline formulation, the point estimate
for the cross-term coefficient is of greater magnitude than the coefficient on in-state
refining capacity alone.18
Table 3.5 presents the results from Table 3.4 specification (3) as probabilities
rather than coefficients from the probit estimation. The point estimates imply that
at the median refinery the expected probability of a fire or explosion in the winter
is 0.41 percent and the expected probability of a fire or explosion in the summer is
0.92 percent. Table 3.5 also presents the expected probability of an incident for the
17I classify spring as March through May, summer as June through August, and fall as September
through November.
18All of the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are robust to estimation based on subsamples (1) excluding
refineries with capacities in the lowest quartile (capacity less than 567 thousand gallons per day)
and (2) excluding refineries closed for more than one quarter of the study period.
131
median refinery conditional on ownership. The point estimates imply that a refinery
of mean capacity unaffiliated with other refining assets has a 0.88 percent expected
incident probability during a summer month. The expected probability of a refinery
of mean capacity owned by a refiner owning 3.4 percent of other in-state capacity, 3.9
percent of other in-PADD capacity and 2.9 percent of other out-of-PADD capacity
is only slightly higher, at 0.93 percent.1 9 If the refinery is located, though, in either
California or Illinois, the expected incident probability of an affiliated refinery is 1.15
percent - approximately 31 percent higher than the expected incident probability of
an unaffiliated refinery.
Two concerns exist with the approach above. The first is that, although I control
for refinery size, omitted variables affecting facility reliability might exist which are
correlated with ownership - biasing the coefficients on ownership. Alternatively, it
could also be the case that refiners choose their porfolio of refineries based partially
on facility-specific incident likelihoods. That is, a refiner owning another facility in
an area is willing to pay a higher price for a refinery with a high probability of a
fire than a refiner without another facility in the area. The correlation I identify in
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, thus, may not be the result of operational incentives, but may be
an artifact of a refiner's selection of her portfolio of refining assets.
Thus, I also test probit specifications in which each refinery's outage probability
is a function of ownership incentives as well as refinery-specific unobservables, cap-
tured with refinery-level fixed effects. In this specification, identification of the effect
of changing ownership incentives comes from within-refinery variation in ownership
over time. That is, I identify the effect of changes in refinery ownership from the
expectation function conditional on refinery and ownership. I estimate the specifi-
cation with refinery-specific dummy variables to allow the probability of a refinery
fire or explosion to vary systematically by facility. Although allowing refinery-specific
dummy variables better models persistent refinery differences related to probabil-
ity of fire or explosion, the use of refinery-specific dummy variables constrains my
19 For calculating the estimated incident probability based on ownership, I assume ownership
characteristics for affiliation with the mean affiliated refiner.
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sample to only those facility which experienced an outage over the sample period.20
This specification estimates the coefficients of the joint ownership proxies based on
the within-refinery changes at only the sixty refineries which experienced a fire or
explosion from January 1995 through December 2001.
Table 3.6 contains the estimated probit coefficients allowing for refinery-level fixed
effects. Specifications (1) through (4) replicate specifications in Table 3.4, with the
exception of omitting the capacity variable. Including refinery fixed effects and lim-
iting the sample to the subset of refineries experiencing a fire or explosion affects
the point estimates and precision of the estimated coefficients. Refinery-level fixed
effects remove much of the variation used to identify the coefficients in the earlier
specifications. As a result, no coefficients on the proxies for ownership are estimated
with precision. Although the point estimate for the cross-term included in specifi-
cations (3) and (4) is of the same sign and magnitude as the corresponding point
estimates in Table 3.4, the signs and magnitudes of the other proxy coefficients vary.
The point estimates of the coefficients on the seasonal or monthly dummy variables,
though, are robust to limiting the sample to the subset of firms with one or more
fires or explosions over the period. Although the results from the Tables 3.3 and 3.4
are consistent with the theoretical model, the results in Table 3.6 do not allow me to
reject the possibility that my earlier results are the result either of omitted variable
bias or endogenous portfolio selection by refiners.
3.6 Conclusion
Regulators studying high prices in a market often face the challenge of differentiating
strategic withholding by producers from unreliable production. If a regulator can-
not verify "unplanned" outages, the regulator cannot credibly distinguish between
strategic withholding and unlucky realizations of facility reliability. In this paper, I
specify a model in which a firm's choices of production and maintenance affect facility
2 0The conditional expectation for a facility for which no incident occurred over the study period,
is trivially identified by the refinery-specific dummy variable.
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reliability. I study how incentives arising from ownership of more than one facility
affect facility reliability. Under derived functional form restrictions on demand, my
model provides an alternative to strategic withholding as an explanation as to why a
correlation may exist between benefits to a firm from unanticipated facility outages
in a market and the reliability of facilities owned by that firm. Intuitively, if facility
outages affect prices in a market, firms owning more than one facility will have dif-
ferent operational and maintenance incentives than firms owning a single facility in
a market. Differences in incentives for firms owning more than one facility depend
on demand conditions - in months or markets in which price respond more to facil-
ity outages, operation of affiliated facilities differ relative to operation of unaffiliated
facilities.
I collect a dataset of unanticipated and verifiable incidents, including fires, ex-
plosions and other unplanned events, at domestic oil refineries from January 1995
through December 2001. I then test whether the pattern of incidents is consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical model. I find statistically significant evidence
that ownership of other local refining capacity is correlated with the probability of
an outage at a given refinery. In addition, the relationship between ownership and
incident likelihood is greatest for markets with special gasoline formulations. It is
in markets with special content regulations that a refinery outage has the largest
effect of gasoline prices. In these markets, expected incident likelihood is 30 percent
greater for a refinery affiliated with another refinery that it is for an unaffiliated re-
finery. I find that although the evidence is consistent with the model, I am unable
to statistically rule out the alternative hypothesis that firms select refineries based
on refinery-specific outage probabilities - that is, refinery outages are less costly for a
firm with multiple refineries, as a result, theory predicts these firms would be willing
to pay more than firms without other refineries for unreliable assets.
Regardless of the source of the correlation, this research has several implications
for merger and regulatory policy. First, this paper proposes an important source
of unanticipated outages, which could be correlated with the incentives of a firm to
strategically withhold output in a market. This result complicates the job of the
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regulator - it is not sufficient to assess the incentives for strategic withholding as
evidence for explicit withholding by a firm. In addition, the theoretical model defines
market conditions under which it is reasonable to expect operation and maintenance of
affiliated firms to differ substantially from unaffiliated firms. To the extent that price
volatility concerns regulators (or legislators directing regulatory activity), the model
identifies characteristics of markets for which reliability concerns may be greatest.
Finally, refinery fires and explosions create price volatility in local gasoline markets.
This paper also provides descriptive statistics on incident frequency at refineries,
potentially useful to gasoline regulation policy makers.
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Refiner
Murphy Oil
Tesoro
Outage Date Outage Nature
Tesoro
Motiva
Chevron
ExxonMobil
Crown Central Petro Group
Murphy Oil
Frontier Refining
Valero
Country Mark
Crown Central Petro Group
Citgo
Coastal Corp
Conoco
PDV America/Citgo
Deer Park Ltd
BP
Shell
Motiva
deer park td
Ultramar Diamond Shamrock
Blackstone Group
Inland
Sunoco
Orion
BP
BP
Hunt Refining
Tosco
Tosco
ExxonMobil
Chalmette Rfg.
Clark
Sunoco
Coastal Corp
Sunoco
Sunoco
Motiva
Marathon Ashland
Sunoco
Sunoco
Orion
Tosco
Blackstone Group
BP Amoco
Flying J
Coastal Corp
BP
Exxon Mobil
Clark
Pennzoil
Clark
Conoco
Holly Corp
Chalmette Rfg.
Tosco
Williams
Sunoco
Hunt Refining
Motiva
Pennzoil
Citgo
Mobil
Chevron
Sunoco
6-Jun-02 Fire at operating unit.
9-Mar-02 Explosion at deasphalting plant.
24-Feb-02 Fire following power outage.
22-Jan-02 Fire at hydrotreater.
20-Jan-02 Explosion
13-Jan-02 Fire
13-Jan-02 Fire at alkylation unit.
7-Jan-02 Fire and explosion at gasoline storage tank.
19-Dec-01 Explosion at hydrogen compressor.
29-Nov-01 Explosion at asphalting unit
25-Nov-01 Fire in naphtha unit.
23-Nov-01 Explosion
21-Sep-01 Explosion and fire at hydrocracking unit.
8-Sep-01 Fire at distillation unit.
16-Aug-01 Removal of Cat Cracker from service.
14-Aug-01 Fire at distillation unit.
8-Aug-01 Fire
27-Jul-01 Fire at disillation unit.
18-Jul-01 Fire
17-Jul-01 Fire and acid spill.
14-Jul-01 Fire at coker.
9-Jul-01 Fire and explosion at alkylation unit.
1-May-01 Lightning Strike
4-Jul-01 Fire
30-Jun-01 Fire at reformer.
7-Jun-01 Lightning Strike
6-Jun-01 Fire at reformer.
26-May-01 Fire at cracking unit
13-May-01 Fire and Explosion.
28-Apr-01 Fire at distillation unit.
23-Apr-01 Fire at coker.
1-Mar-01 Delayed restart.
19-Jan-01 Fire.
1-Jan-01 Upgrades.
23-Dec-00 Fire.
8-Sep-00 Fire at dewaxer.
7-Sep-00 Fire at distillation unit.
30-Aug-00 Fire at Cat Cracker.
18-Aug-00 Explosion at Hydro Cracker
5-Aug-00 Fire at Reformer and Hydro Cracker
30-Jun-00 Explosion.
21-Jun-00 Release of Catalyst
10-Jun-00 Explosion.
7-Jun-00 Fire at coker.
25-May-00 Fire at distillation unit.
4-Apr-00 Fire at reformer.
17-Mar-00 Explosion.
1-Mar-00 Fire.
1-Mar-00 Fire at distillation unit.
23-Feb-00 Fire.
29-Jan-00 Fire at Cat Cracker.
18-Jan-00 Explosion.
24-Dec-99 Explosion.
28-Nov-99 Fire and Explosion at Storage Tank
19-Nov-99 Fire.
17-Nov-99 Fire at coker.
9-Nov-99 Fire at oil tank.
26-Oct-99 Chemical release.
28-Aug-99 Explosion at distillation unit.
18-Aug-99 Fire.
13-Aug-99 Fire.
13-Aug-99 Fire at storage tank.
9-Aug-99 Explosion at boiler.
28-Jul-99 Fire at Hydrogen Facility.
10-Jul-99 Fire.
21-Jun-99 Fire at hydrotreater.
Table 3.1: Identified Refinery Incidents
January 1995 - December 2001
Refinery
Meraux
Anacortes
State
Salt Lake City
Delaware City
El Segundo
Baton Rouge
Pasadena
Superior
Cheyenne
Benecia
Mount Vernon
Pasadena
Lake Charles
Westville
Ponca City
Lemont
Deer Park
Yorktown
Martinez
Delaware City
Deer Park
Three Rivers
Port Arthur
Woods Cross
Philadelphia
Norco
Yorktown
Los Angeles
Tuscoloosa
Wood River
Wilmington
Benicia
Chalmette
Blue Island
Philadelphia
Westville
Philadelphia
Marcus Hook
Convent
Robinson
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Norco
Avon
Port Arthur
Salt Lake City
North Salt Lake
Westville
Whiting
Baton Rouge
Blue Island
Shreveport
Blue Island
Ponca City
Great Falls
Chalmette
Wilmington
Memphis
Toledo
Tuscoloosa
Convent
Shreveport
Corpus Christi
Torrance
Richmond
Philadelphia
Louisiana
Washington
Utah
Delaware
California
Louisiana
Texas
Wisconsin
Wyoming
California
Indiana
Texas
Louisiana
New Jersey
Oklahoma
Illinois
Texas
Virginia
California
Delaware
Texas
Texas
Texas
Utah
Pennsylvania
Louisiana
Virginia
California
Alabama
Illinois
California
California
Louisiana
Illinois
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Louisiana
Illinois
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Louisiana
California
Texas
Utah
Utah
New Jersey
Indiana
Louisiana
Illinois
Louisiana
Illinois
Oklahoma
Montana
Louisiana
California
Tennessee
Ohio
Alabama
Louisiana
Louisiana
Texas
California
California
Pennsylvania
Information
Source
D
D
B
D
B
D
D
B
A, B
B
B
D
A, D
B
A
B
A
B
D
D
A
A, D
A
A
D
A, B
A, B
B
A, B
A, B
A, D
A
A
A
A
A
B, D
D
D
D
D
D
A
A
C
A
B
A
A
A
B
A, B
B
A, B
A
B
A, B
B
A, B
A
A
A
A, B
A
A, C
A
W
Table 3.1: Identified Refinery Incidents (continued)
January 1995 - December 2001
State
Tennessee
Texas
Texas
Oklahoma
Indiana
California
California
California
Illinois
Ohio
Arkansas
Pennsylvania
Washington
North Dakota
Montana
Pennsylvania
California
Louisiana
California
California
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Louisiana
Texas
Texas
Kentucky
Minnesota
Texas
California
Louisiana
California
New Jersey
California
Califomrnia
Illinois
Louisiana
Ohio
Oklahoma
New Jersey
North Dakota
Minnesota
California
California
Colorado
California
Texas
Pennsylvania
Louisiana
Texas
Arkansas
Kentucky
Tennessee
Louisiana
Illinois
Refiner
Williams
Coastal Corp
Lyondell
Sunoco
BP
Arco
Chevron
Tosco
Citgo
BP
Cross Petrol
Tosco
Equilon
Amoco
Cenex
Tosco
Arco
BP
Tosco
Tosco
Ultramar Diamond Shamrock
Sunoco
Star
Shell
Shell
Ashland Oil
Ashland Oil
Citgo
Tosco
Mobil
Texaco
Tosco
Mobil
Texaco
clark oil
Shell
BP
Conoco
Tosco
Amoco
Koch
Unocal
Shell
TPI
Shell
Exxon
Pennzoil
Murphy Oil
Amoco
Lion Oil
Ashland Oil
Mapco
Mobil
Clark Oil
Outage Date Outage Nature
16-Jun-99 Fire at Cat Cracker.
14-May-99 Fire at reformer.
7-May-99 Fire and explosion at coker.
27-Apr-99 Fire at coker.
20-Apr-99 Explosion at Cat Cracker.
27-Mar-99 Cogen Plant Failure.
26-Mar-99 Fire at Hydro Cracker.
23-Feb-99 Fire at disillation unit.
23-Feb-99 Fire at distillation unit.
9-Feb-99 Fire.
13-Jan-99 Explosion at tank.
15-Dec-98 Fire at pipeline.
13-Dec-98 Fire at coker.
24-Oct-98 Fire at distillation unit.
19-Oct-98 Fire at pipeline.
16-Oct-98 Explosion at Storage Tank.
8-Oct-98 Fire.
2-Oct-98 Fire.
25-Aug-98 Fire.
30-Jul-98 Fire.
13-Jul-98 Fire at distillation unit.
26-Jun-98 Power Outage and Shutdown of Cat Cracker.
13-Apr-98 Fire.
13-Jul-97 Fire at coker.
22-Jun-97 Fire at Olefin Processing Unit.
7-Jun-97 Explosion at Reformer.
16-May-97 Explosion.
14-May-97 Explosion at Alkylation Unit.
22-Jan-97 Explosion at Hydro Cracker
22-Jan-97 Fire.
13-Jan-97 Fire at alkylation unit.
1-Jan-97 Unscheduled Shutdown of Cat Cracker.
21-Nov-96 Fire.
11-Nov-96 Explosion at Hydrotreater.
19-Oct-96 Propane Fire.
15-Oct-96 Fire.
15-Oct-96 Fire at distillation unit.
10-Jul-96 Fire at hydrotreater.
12-Jun-96 Fire.
11-Jun-96 Vapor emission.
21-May-96 Lightning Strike
17-May-96 Fire at coker.
1-Apr-96 Explosion at Hydrotreater.
5-Feb-96 Fire.
2-Feb-96 Explosion at Hydrogen unit.
16-Nov-95 Explosion at Hydrotreater.
17-Oct-95 Explosion
28-Jul-95 Explosion
25-Jul-95 Fire at Cat Cracker.
22-Jul-95 Fire at storage tank.
27-Jun-95 Fire at storage tank.
20-Jun-95 Fire.
27-Apr-95 Fire at distillation unit.
14-Mar-95 Explosion and fire.
Source: A - Local or Regional News Source
B - US Chemical Safety Board Filing
C - SEC Filing
D - Acusafe Monthly Incident Reports
Refinery
Memphis
Corpus Christi
Houston
Tulsa
VWhiting
Los Angeles
Richmond
Avon
Lemont
toledo
Smackover
Trainer
Anacortes
Mandan
Laurel
Trainer
Los Angeles
Belle Chasse
Avon
Avon
Ardmore
Philadelphia
Convent
Deer Park
Deer Park,
Catlettsburg
St Paul Park
Corpus Christi
Avon
Chalmette
Wilmington
Bayway
Torrance
Wilmington
Blue Island
Norco
toledo
Pcnca City
Linden
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Table 3.3:
Estimated Coefficients from Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: Refinery Incident Dummy
Specification
Variables (1) (2)' (3) (4)
Constant -2.820*** -2.771*** -2.821*** -2.771***
0.099 0.156 0.099 0.157
Refinery Capacity 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043***
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
In-State Refining Capacity*CA/IL Dummy 0.030* 0.030*
0.017 0.017
In-State Refining Capacity 0.015* 0.016* 0.000 0.001
0.009 0.009 0.013 0.013
Out-of-State, In-PADD Refining Capacity -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Out-of-PADD Refining Capacity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Spring 0.076 0.073
0.119 0.119
Summer 0.291** 0.291**
0.108 0.108
Fall 0.131 0.131
0.116 0.116
February -0.018 -0.020
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Facility Fixed Effects None
Temporal Fixed Effects Seasonal
0.205
-0.079
0.214
0.086
0.193
0.051
0.201
0.239
0.183
0.270
0.181
0.210
0.186
-0.161
0.224
0.146
0.193
0.180
0.189
-0.150
0.226
None
Monthly
None
Seasonal
0.205
-0.084
0.214
0.084
0.194
0.048
0.201
0.241
0.183
0.266
0.181
0.212
0.186
-0.160
0.224
0.146
0.193
0.178
0.189
-0.149
0.226
None
Monthly
Pseudo R-Squared
Log-likelyhood
N
0.0387
-539.5
12905
0.0428
-537.2
12905
Notes: Point estimates in bold type. Robust standard errors listed below.
*Denotes significance at the 10% level.
**Denotes significance at the 5% level.
***Denotes significance at the 1% level.
0.0411
-538.2
12905
0.0452
-535.9
12905
Table 3.4:
Estimated Coefficients from Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: Refinery Incident Dummy
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -2.829*** -2.779*** -2.831*** -2.780***
0.099 0.157 0.099 0.157
Refinery Capacity 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.041*
0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
Percent of In-State Refining Capacity*CAIIL Dummy 2.335** 2.343**
1.045 1.040
Percent of In-State Refining Capacity 0.749* 0.765** 0.414 0.435
0.386 0.385 0.476 0.473
Percent of Out-of-State, In-PADD Refining Capacity 0.331 0.322 0.095 0.084
0.709 0.702 0.743 0.735
Percent of Out-of-PADD Refining Capacity 0.600 0.558 0.130 0.081
1.883 1.861 1.997 1.975
Spring 0.080 0.077
0.119 0.119
Summer 0.296*** 0.294***
0.108 0.109
Fall 0.134 0.133
0.116 0.117
February -0.021 -0.020
0.204 0.205
March -0.075 -0.084
0.214 0.214
April 0.089 0.090
0.193 0.194
May 0.051 0.049
0.201 0.201
June 0.241 0.242
0.183 0.183
July 0.277 0.271
0.181 0.182
August 0.210 0.210
0.186 0.186
September -0.161 -0.160
0.224 0.224
October 0.144 0.145
0.192 0.193
November 0.183 0.181
0.189 0.189
December -0.152 -0.153
0.225 0.225
Facility Fixed Effects None None None None
Temporal Fixed Effects Seasonal Monthly Seasonal Monthly
Pseudo R-Squared
Log-likelyhood
N
Notes: Point estimates in bold type. Robust standard errors listed below.
*Denotes significance at the 10% level.
**Denotes significance at the 5% level.
***Denotes ignificance at the 1% level.
0.0384
-539.7
12905
0.0425
-537.4
12905
0.0421
-537.6
12905
0.0463
-535.3
12905
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Table 3.6:
Estimated Coefficients from Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: Refinery Incident Dummy
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant
Percent of In-State Refining Capacity
Percent of Out-of-State, In-PADD Refining Capacity
Percent of Out-of-PADD Refining Capacity
Percent of In-State Refining Capacity*CA/IL Dummy
Spring
Summer
Fall
February
-2.420***
0.426
-1.843
1.567
-0.548
2.142
2.333
3.484
0.111
0.125
0.356***
0.115
0.178
0.121
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Facility Fixed Effects
Temporal Fixed Effects
-2.373***
0.423
-1.878
1.561
-0.538
2.125
2.401
3.444
0.020
0.217
-0.053
0.226
0.144
0.206
0.110
0.209
0.291
0.193
0.374**
0.193
0.290
0.198
-0.155
0.233
0.215
0.201
0.269
0.200
-0.148
0.235
-2.340***
0.421
-2.882
2.204
-1.254
2.177
2.277
3.499
3.007
2.616
0.109
0.125
0.351***
0.115
0.176
0.121
-2.288***
0.414
-2.940
2.203
-1.253
2.162
2.342
3.459
3.065
2.600
0.016
0.217
-0.058
0.226
0.140
0.206
0.103
0.209
0.280
0.191
0.366*
0.192
0.285
0.198
-0.161
0.232
0.211
0.200
0.262
0.200
-0.153
0.236
Refinery-leve Refinery-leve Refinery-leve Refinery-level
None Seasonal Monthly Month-year
Pseudo R-Squared
Log-likelyhood
N
0.0486
-440.3
4610
0.0543
-437.7
4610
0.0498
-439.8
4610
0.0556
-437.1
4610
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